- 19 Mar, 2018 16 commits
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 612e8e93 upstream. The alternatives code checks only the first byte whether it is a NOP, but with NOPs in front of the payload and having actual instructions after it breaks the "optimized' test. Make sure to scan all bytes before deciding to optimize the NOPs in there. Reported-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: Andrew Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180110112815.mgciyf5acwacphkq@pd.tnic Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 66c117d7 upstream. Richard reported the following crash: [ 0.036000] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 55501e06 [ 0.036000] IP: [<c0aae48b>] common_interrupt+0xb/0x38 [ 0.036000] Call Trace: [ 0.036000] [<c0409c80>] ? add_nops+0x90/0xa0 [ 0.036000] [<c040a054>] apply_alternatives+0x274/0x630 Chuck decoded: " 0: 8d 90 90 83 04 24 lea 0x24048390(%eax),%edx 6: 80 fc 0f cmp $0xf,%ah 9: a8 0f test $0xf,%al >> b: a0 06 1e 50 55 mov 0x55501e06,%al 10: 57 push %edi 11: 56 push %esi Interrupt 0x30 occurred while the alternatives code was replacing the initial 0x90,0x90,0x90 NOPs (from the ASM_CLAC macro) with the optimized version, 0x8d,0x76,0x00. Only the first byte has been replaced so far, and it makes a mess out of the insn decoding." optimize_nops() is buggy in two aspects: - It's not disabling interrupts across the modification - It's lacking a sync_core() call Add both. Fixes: 4fd4b6e5 'x86/alternatives: Use optimized NOPs for padding' Reported-and-tested-by:
"Richard W.M. Jones" <rjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit dbe4058a upstream. Quentin caught a corner case with the generation of instruction padding in the ALTERNATIVE_2 macro: if len(orig_insn) < len(alt1) < len(alt2), then not enough padding gets added and that is not good(tm) as we could overwrite the beginning of the next instruction. Luckily, at the time of this writing, we don't have ALTERNATIVE_2() invocations which have that problem and even if we did, a simple fix would be to prepend the instructions with enough prefixes so that that corner case doesn't happen. However, best it would be if we fixed it properly. See below for a simple, abstracted example of what we're doing. So what we ended up doing is, we compute the max(len(alt1), len(alt2)) - len(orig_insn) and feed that value to the .skip gas directive. The max() cannot have conditionals due to gas limitations, thus the fancy integer math. With this patch, all ALTERNATIVE_2 sites get padded correctly; generating obscure test cases pass too: #define alt_max_short(a, b) ((a) ^ (((a) ^ (b)) & -(-((a) < (b))))) #define gen_skip(orig, alt1, alt2, marker) \ .skip -((alt_max_short(alt1, alt2) - (orig)) > 0) * \ (alt_max_short(alt1, alt2) - (orig)),marker .pushsection .text, "ax" .globl main main: gen_skip(1, 2, 4, 0x09) gen_skip(4, 1, 2, 0x10) ... .popsection Thanks to Quentin for catching it and double-checking the fix! Reported-by:
Quentin Casasnovas <quentin.casasnovas@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 69df353f upstream. Take a look at the first instruction byte before optimizing the NOP - there might be something else there already, like the ALTERNATIVE_2() in rdtsc_barrier() which NOPs out on AMD even though we just patched in an MFENCE. This happens because the alternatives sees X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, AMD CPUs set it, we patch in the MFENCE and right afterwards it sees X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC which AMD CPUs don't set and we blindly optimize the NOP. Checking whether at least the first byte is 0x90 prevents that. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 9ecccfaa upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6 ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 61dc0f55 upstream. Implement the CPU vulnerabilty show functions for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.177414879@linutronix.de [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Meltdown mitigation feature flag is KAISER - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 87590ce6 upstream. As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 62a67e12 upstream. Should be easier when following boot paths. It probably is a left over from the x86 unification eons ago. No functionality change. Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 99c6fa25 upstream. Add the bug bits for spectre v1/2 and force them unconditionally for all cpus. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit de791821 upstream. Use the name associated with the particular attack which needs page table isolation for mitigation. Signed-off-by:
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Tom Lendacky authored
commit 694d99d4 upstream. AMD processors are not subject to the types of attacks that the kernel page table isolation feature protects against. The AMD microarchitecture does not allow memory references, including speculative references, that access higher privileged data when running in a lesser privileged mode when that access would result in a page fault. Disable page table isolation by default on AMD processors by not setting the X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE feature, which controls whether X86_FEATURE_PTI is set. Signed-off-by:
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit a89f040f upstream. Many x86 CPUs leak information to user space due to missing isolation of user space and kernel space page tables. There are many well documented ways to exploit that. The upcoming software migitation of isolating the user and kernel space page tables needs a misfeature flag so code can be made runtime conditional. Add the BUG bits which indicates that the CPU is affected and add a feature bit which indicates that the software migitation is enabled. Assume for now that _ALL_ x86 CPUs are affected by this. Exceptions can be made later. Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit 6cbd2171 upstream. There is currently no way to force CPU bug bits like CPU feature bits. That makes it impossible to set a bug bit once at boot and have it stick for all upcoming CPUs. Extend the force set/clear arrays to handle bug bits as well. Signed-off-by:
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Andy Lutomirski authored
commit 8bf1ebca upstream. There are multiple call sites that apply forced CPU caps. Factor them into a helper. Signed-off-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
commit 01c9b17b upstream. Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by:
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Jim Mattson authored
commit 0cb5b306 upstream. Guest GPR values are live in the hardware GPRs at VM-exit. Do not leave any guest values in hardware GPRs after the guest GPR values are saved to the vcpu_vmx structure. This is a partial mitigation for CVE 2017-5715 and CVE 2017-5753. Specifically, it defeats the Project Zero PoC for CVE 2017-5715. Suggested-by:
Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> [Paolo: Add AMD bits, Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>] Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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- 03 Mar, 2018 24 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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James Hogan authored
commit 8dbc1864 upstream. Commit 17278a91 ("MIPS: CPS: Fix r1 .set mt assembler warning") added .set MIPS_ISA_LEVEL_RAW to silence warnings about .set mt on r1, however this can result in a MOVE being encoded as a 64-bit DADDU instruction on certain version of binutils (e.g. 2.22), and reserved instruction exceptions at runtime on 32-bit hardware. Reduce the sizes of the push/pop sections to include only instructions that are part of the MT ASE or which won't convert to 64-bit instructions after .set mips64r2/mips64r6. Reported-by:
Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org> Fixes: 17278a91 ("MIPS: CPS: Fix r1 .set mt assembler warning") Signed-off-by:
James Hogan <jhogan@kernel.org> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Tested-by:
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Yang Shunyong authored
commit 66b3bd23 upstream. The type of arg passed to dmatest_callback is struct dmatest_done. It refers to test_done in struct dmatest_thread, not done_wait. Fixes: 6f6a23a2 ("dmaengine: dmatest: move callback wait ...") Signed-off-by:
Yang Shunyong <shunyong.yang@hxt-semitech.com> Acked-by:
Adam Wallis <awallis@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by:
Vinod Koul <vinod.koul@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Håkon Bugge authored
commit f3069c6d upstream. This is a fix for syzkaller719569, where memory registration was attempted without any underlying transport being loaded. Analysis of the case reveals that it is the setsockopt() RDS_GET_MR (2) and RDS_GET_MR_FOR_DEST (7) that are vulnerable. Here is an example stack trace when the bug is hit: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000c0 IP: __rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds] PGD 2f93d03067 P4D 2f93d03067 PUD 2f93d02067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: bridge stp llc tun rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache rds binfmt_misc sb_edac intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul c rc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel pcbc aesni_intel crypto_simd glue_helper cryptd iTCO_wdt mei_me sg iTCO_vendor_support ipmi_si mei ipmi_devintf nfsd shpchp pcspkr i2c_i801 ioatd ma ipmi_msghandler wmi lpc_ich mfd_core auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 mgag200 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper ixgbe syscopyarea ahci sysfillrect sysimgblt libahci mdio fb_sys_fops ttm ptp libata sd_mod mlx4_core drm crc32c_intel pps_core megaraid_sas i2c_core dca dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod CPU: 48 PID: 45787 Comm: repro_set2 Not tainted 4.14.2-3.el7uek.x86_64 #2 Hardware name: Oracle Corporation ORACLE SERVER X5-2L/ASM,MOBO TRAY,2U, BIOS 31110000 03/03/2017 task: ffff882f9190db00 task.stack: ffffc9002b994000 RIP: 0010:__rds_rdma_map+0x36/0x440 [rds] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002b997df0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff882fa2182580 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffc9002b997e40 RDI: ffff882fa2182580 RBP: ffffc9002b997e30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000002 R10: ffff885fb29e3838 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff882fa2182580 R13: ffff882fa2182580 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000020000ffc FS: 00007fbffa20b700(0000) GS:ffff882fbfb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000000000c0 CR3: 0000002f98a66006 CR4: 00000000001606e0 Call Trace: rds_get_mr+0x56/0x80 [rds] rds_setsockopt+0x172/0x340 [rds] ? __fget_light+0x25/0x60 ? __fdget+0x13/0x20 SyS_setsockopt+0x80/0xe0 do_syscall_64+0x67/0x1b0 entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 RIP: 0033:0x7fbff9b117f9 RSP: 002b:00007fbffa20aed8 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000000c84a4 RCX: 00007fbff9b117f9 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000400000000114 RDI: 000000000000109b RBP: 00007fbffa20af10 R08: 0000000000000020 R09: 00007fbff9dd7860 R10: 0000000020000ffc R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007fbffa20b9c0 R14: 00007fbffa20b700 R15: 0000000000000021 Code: 41 56 41 55 49 89 fd 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 8b 87 f0 02 00 00 48 89 55 d0 48 89 4d c8 85 c0 0f 84 2d 03 00 00 48 8b 87 00 03 00 00 <48> 83 b8 c0 00 00 00 00 0f 84 25 03 00 0 0 48 8b 06 48 8b 56 08 The fix is to check the existence of an underlying transport in __rds_rdma_map(). Signed-off-by:
Håkon Bugge <haakon.bugge@oracle.com> Reported-by:
syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by:
Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
commit 43cdd1b7 upstream. There's no need to be printing a raw kernel pointer to the kernel log at every boot. So just remove it, and change the whole message to use the correct dev_info() call at the same time. Reported-by:
Wang Qize <wang_qize@venustech.com.cn> Signed-off-by:
Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Mentz authored
commit a1dfb4c4 upstream. The 32-bit compat v4l2 ioctl handling is implemented based on its 64-bit equivalent. It converts 32-bit data structures into its 64-bit equivalents and needs to provide the data to the 64-bit ioctl in user space memory which is commonly allocated using compat_alloc_user_space(). However, due to how that function is implemented, it can only be called a single time for every syscall invocation. Supposedly to avoid this limitation, the existing code uses a mix of memory from the kernel stack and memory allocated through compat_alloc_user_space(). Under normal circumstances, this would not work, because the 64-bit ioctl expects all pointers to point to user space memory. As a workaround, set_fs(KERNEL_DS) is called to temporarily disable this extra safety check and allow kernel pointers. However, this might introduce a security vulnerability: The result of the 32-bit to 64-bit conversion is writeable by user space because the output buffer has been allocated via compat_alloc_user_space(). A malicious user space process could then manipulate pointers inside this output buffer, and due to the previous set_fs(KERNEL_DS) call, functions like get_user() or put_user() no longer prevent kernel memory access. The new approach is to pre-calculate the total amount of user space memory that is needed, allocate it using compat_alloc_user_space() and then divide up the allocated memory to accommodate all data structures that need to be converted. An alternative approach would have been to retain the union type karg that they allocated on the kernel stack in do_video_ioctl(), copy all data from user space into karg and then back to user space. However, we decided against this approach because it does not align with other compat syscall implementations. Instead, we tried to replicate the get_user/put_user pairs as found in other places in the kernel: if (get_user(clipcount, &up->clipcount) || put_user(clipcount, &kp->clipcount)) return -EFAULT; Notes from hans.verkuil@cisco.com: This patch was taken from: https://github.com/LineageOS/android_kernel_samsung_apq8084/commit/97b733953c06e4f0398ade18850f0817778255f7 Clearly nobody could be bothered to upstream this patch or at minimum tell us :-( We only heard about this a week ago. This patch was rebased and cleaned up. Compared to the original I also swapped the order of the convert_in_user arguments so that they matched copy_in_user. It was hard to review otherwise. I also replaced the ALLOC_USER_SPACE/ALLOC_AND_GET by a normal function. Fixes: 6b5a9492 ("v4l: introduce string control support.") Signed-off-by:
Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com> Co-developed-by:
Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com> Acked-by:
Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com> [bwh: Rebased on top of some earlier fixes] Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit d83a8243 upstream. Some ioctls need to copy back the result even if the ioctl returned an error. However, don't do this for the error code -ENOTTY. It makes no sense in that cases. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 169f24ca upstream. There is nothing wrong with using an unknown buffer type. So stop spamming the kernel log whenever this happens. The kernel will just return -EINVAL to signal this. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit a751be5b upstream. put_v4l2_window32() didn't copy back the clip list to userspace. Drivers can update the clip rectangles, so this should be done. Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Mentz authored
commit 025a26fa upstream. Commit b2787845 ("V4L/DVB (5289): Add support for video output overlays.") added the field global_alpha to struct v4l2_window but did not update the compat layer accordingly. This change adds global_alpha to struct v4l2_window32 and copies the value for global_alpha back and forth. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit b8c601e8 upstream. ctrl_is_pointer just hardcoded two known string controls, but that caused problems when using e.g. custom controls that use a pointer for the payload. Reimplement this function: it now finds the v4l2_ctrl (if the driver uses the control framework) or it calls vidioc_query_ext_ctrl (if the driver implements that directly). In both cases it can now check if the control is a pointer control or not. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 8ed5a59d upstream. The struct v4l2_plane32 should set m.userptr as well. The same happens in v4l2_buffer32 and v4l2-compliance tests for this. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 333b1e9f upstream. Instead of doing sizeof(struct foo) use sizeof(*up). There even were cases where 4 * sizeof(__u32) was used instead of sizeof(kp->reserved), which is very dangerous when the size of the reserved array changes. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 486c5215 upstream. These helper functions do not really help. Move the code to the __get/put_v4l2_format32 functions. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit b7b957d4 upstream. The indentation of this source is all over the place. Fix this. This patch only changes whitespace. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 3ee6d040 upstream. The result of the VIDIOC_PREPARE_BUF ioctl was never copied back to userspace since it was missing in the switch. Signed-off-by:
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Ricardo Ribalda authored
commit 3171cc2b upstream. According to the doc, V4L2_BUF_FLAG_DONE is cleared after DQBUF: V4L2_BUF_FLAG_DONE 0x00000004 ... After calling the VIDIOC_QBUF or VIDIOC_DQBUF it is always cleared ... Unfortunately, it seems that videobuf2 keeps it set after DQBUF. This can be tested with vivid and dev_debug: [257604.338082] video1: VIDIOC_DQBUF: 71:33:25.00260479 index=3, type=vid-cap, flags=0x00002004, field=none, sequence=163, memory=userptr, bytesused=460800, offset/userptr=0x344b000, length=460800 This patch forces FLAG_DONE to 0 after calling DQBUF. Reported-by:
Dimitrios Katsaros <patcherwork@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Ricardo Ribalda Delgado <ricardo.ribalda@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 181a4a2d upstream. If the ioctl returned -ENOTTY, then don't bother copying back the result as there is no point. Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
The prefix is ADV7604_, not ADV76XX. Fixes: f31b62e1 ("adv7604: add hdmi driver strength adjustment") Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 037e0865 upstream. The v4l2_input32 struct wasn't updated when this field was added. It didn't cause a failure in the compat code, but it is better to keep it in sync with v4l2_input to avoid confusion. Signed-off-by:
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Tiffany Lin authored
commit baf43c6e upstream. In v4l2-compliance utility, test VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS will check whether reserved filed of v4l2_create_buffers filled with zero Reserved field is filled with zero in v4l_create_bufs. This patch copy reserved field of v4l2_create_buffer from kernel space to user space Signed-off-by:
Tiffany Lin <tiffany.lin@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Signed-off-by:
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Guennadi Liakhovetski authored
commit 6ed9b285 upstream. Similar to an earlier patch, fixing reading user-space data for the VIDIOC_CREATE_BUFS ioctl() in 32-bit compatibility mode, this patch fixes writing back of the possibly modified struct to the user. However, unlike the former bug, this one is much less harmful, because it only results in the kernel failing to write the .type field back to the user, but in fact this is likely unneeded, because the kernel will hardly want to change that field. Therefore this bug is more of a theoretical nature. Signed-off-by:
Guennadi Liakhovetski <g.liakhovetski@gmx.de> Acked-by:
Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Signed-off-by:
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Hans Verkuil authored
commit 8ae632b1 upstream. A lot of these warnings are caused by the fact that we don't generally use __user in videodev2.h. Normally the video_usercopy function will copy anything pointed to by pointers into kernel space, so having __user in the struct will only cause lots of warnings in the drivers. But the flip side of that is that you need to add __force casts here. drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:337:26: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:337:30: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:338:31: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:338:49: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:343:21: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:346:21: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:349:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:349:46: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:352:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:352:54: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:363:26: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:363:32: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:364:31: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:364:51: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:371:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:371:56: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:376:35: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:376:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:430:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:433:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:433:56: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:501:24: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:507:48: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:507:56: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:565:18: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:670:22: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:680:29: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:692:55: warning: incorrect type in initializer (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:773:18: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:786:30: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:786:44: warning: incorrect type in argument 2 (different address spaces) drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:674:37: warning: dereference of noderef expression drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-compat-ioctl32.c:718:37: warning: dereference of noderef expression Signed-off-by:
Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Ming Lei authored
commit 0048b483 upstream. Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously wrong because the request can be freed any time and some fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops might be triggered[1]. Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is that the flush request can share same tag with the request cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag] with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned from) of the tag. Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch. Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag]. [1] kernel oops log [ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M [ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M [ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M [ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M [ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M [ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M [ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M [ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M [ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M [ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M [ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M [ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M [ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M [ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M [ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M [ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M [ 439.730500] Stack:^M [ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M [ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M [ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M [ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M [ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M [ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M [ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M [ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M [ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b 53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10 ^M [ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M [ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M [ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M [ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M Signed-off-by:
Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Flush state is in struct request_queue, not struct blk_flush_queue - Flush request cloning is done in blk_mq_clone_flush_request() rather than blk_kick_flush() - Drop changes in bt{,_tags}_for_each() - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by:
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