- 19 Mar, 2018 40 commits
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Ben Hutchings authored
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Arnd Bergmann authored
I ran into a 4.9 build warning in randconfig testing, starting with the KAISER patches: arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c: In function 'alloc_ldt_struct': arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h:208:24: error: large integer implicitly truncated to unsigned type [-Werror=overflow] #define __PAGE_KERNEL (__PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC | _PAGE_NX) ^ arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c:81:6: note: in expansion of macro '__PAGE_KERNEL' __PAGE_KERNEL); ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ I originally ran into this last year when the patches were part of linux-next, and tried to work around it by using the proper 'pteval_t' types consistently, but that caused additional problems. This takes a much simpler approach, and makes the argument type of the dummy helper always 64-bit, which is wide enough for any page table layout and won't hurt since this call is just an empty stub anyway. Fixes: 8f0baadf ("kaiser: merged update") Signed-off-by:Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Acked-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by:
Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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Dan Williams authored
commit 304ec1b0 upstream. Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. __uaccess_begin_nospec() covers __get_user() and copy_from_iter() where the limit check is far away from the user pointer de-reference. In those cases a barrier_nospec() prevents speculation with a potential pointer to privileged memory. uaccess_try_nospec covers get_user_try. Suggested-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Suggested-by:
Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727416953.33451.10508284228526170604.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Convert several more functions to use __uaccess_begin_nospec(), that are just wrappers in mainline - There's no 'case 8' in __copy_to_user_inatomic() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b5c4ae4f upstream. In preparation for converting some __uaccess_begin() instances to __uacess_begin_nospec(), make sure all 'from user' uaccess paths are using the _begin(), _end() helpers rather than open-coded stac() and clac(). No functional changes. Suggested-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b3bbfb3f upstream. For __get_user() paths, do not allow the kernel to speculate on the value of a user controlled pointer. In addition to the 'stac' instruction for Supervisor Mode Access Protection (SMAP), a barrier_nospec() causes the access_ok() result to resolve in the pipeline before the CPU might take any speculative action on the pointer value. Given the cost of 'stac' the speculation barrier is placed after 'stac' to hopefully overlap the cost of disabling SMAP with the cost of flushing the instruction pipeline. Since __get_user is a major kernel interface that deals with user controlled pointers, the __uaccess_begin_nospec() mechanism will prevent speculative execution past an access_ok() permission check. While speculative execution past access_ok() is not enough to lead to a kernel memory leak, it is a necessary precondition. To be clear, __uaccess_begin_nospec() is addressing a class of potential problems near __get_user() usages. Note, that while the barrier_nospec() in __uaccess_begin_nospec() is used to protect __get_user(), pointer masking similar to array_index_nospec() will be used for get_user() since it incorporates a bounds check near the usage. uaccess_try_nospec provides the same mechanism for get_user_try. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit de9e478b upstream. In commit 11f1a4b9 ("x86: reorganize SMAP handling in user space accesses") I changed how the stac/clac instructions were generated around the user space accesses, which then made it possible to do batched accesses efficiently for user string copies etc. However, in doing so, I completely spaced out, and didn't even think about the 32-bit case. And nobody really even seemed to notice, because SMAP doesn't even exist until modern Skylake processors, and you'd have to be crazy to run 32-bit kernels on a modern CPU. Which brings us to Andy Lutomirski. He actually tested the 32-bit kernel on new hardware, and noticed that it doesn't work. My bad. The trivial fix is to add the required uaccess begin/end markers around the raw accesses in <asm/uaccess_32.h>. I feel a bit bad about this patch, just because that header file really should be cleaned up to avoid all the duplicated code in it, and this commit just expands on the problem. But this just fixes the bug without any bigger cleanup surgery. Reported-and-tested-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Linus Torvalds authored
commit 11f1a4b9 upstream. This reorganizes how we do the stac/clac instructions in the user access code. Instead of adding the instructions directly to the same inline asm that does the actual user level access and exception handling, add them at a higher level. This is mainly preparation for the next step, where we will expose an interface to allow users to mark several accesses together as being user space accesses, but it does already clean up some code: - the inlined trivial cases of copy_in_user() now do stac/clac just once over the accesses: they used to do one pair around the user space read, and another pair around the write-back. - the {get,put}_user_ex() macros that are used with the catch/try handling don't do any stac/clac at all, because that happens in the try/catch surrounding them. Other than those two cleanups that happened naturally from the re-organization, this should not make any difference. Yet. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit eb6174f6 upstream. The nospec.h header expects the per-architecture header file <asm/barrier.h> to optionally define array_index_mask_nospec(). Include that dependency to prevent inadvertent fallback to the default array_index_mask_nospec() implementation. The default implementation may not provide a full mitigation on architectures that perform data value speculation. Reported-by:
Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 1d91c1d2 upstream. There are multiple problems with the dynamic sanity checking in array_index_nospec_mask_check(): * It causes unnecessary overhead in the 32-bit case since integer sized @index values will no longer cause the check to be compiled away like in the 64-bit case. * In the 32-bit case it may trigger with user controllable input when the expectation is that should only trigger during development of new kernel enabling. * The macro reuses the input parameter in multiple locations which is broken if someone passes an expression like 'index++' to array_index_nospec(). Reported-by:
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Will Deacon authored
commit 8fa80c50 upstream. For architectures providing their own implementation of array_index_mask_nospec() in asm/barrier.h, attempting to use WARN_ONCE() to complain about out-of-range parameters using WARN_ON() results in a mess of mutually-dependent include files. Rather than unpick the dependencies, simply have the core code in nospec.h perform the checking for us. Signed-off-by:
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Acked-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
commit 9de29eac upstream. If i == ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options) then we accidentally print garbage from one space beyond the end of the mitigation_options[] array. Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 9005c683 ("x86/spectre: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180214071416.GA26677@mwanda Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 2961298e upstream. We want to expose the hardware features simply in /proc/cpuinfo as "ibrs", "ibpb" and "stibp". Since AMD has separate CPUID bits for those, use them as the user-visible bits. When the Intel SPEC_CTRL bit is set which indicates both IBRS and IBPB capability, set those (AMD) bits accordingly. Likewise if the Intel STIBP bit is set, set the AMD STIBP that's used for the generic hardware capability. Hide the rest from /proc/cpuinfo by putting "" in the comments. Including RETPOLINE and RETPOLINE_AMD which shouldn't be visible there. There are patches to make the sysfs vulnerabilities information non-readable by non-root, and the same should apply to all information about which mitigations are actually in use. Those *shouldn't* appear in /proc/cpuinfo. The feature bit for whether IBPB is actually used, which is needed for ALTERNATIVEs, is renamed to X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB. Originally-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Darren Kenny authored
commit af189c95 upstream. Fixes: 117cc7a9 ("x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit") Signed-off-by:
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180202191220.blvgkgutojecxr3b@starbug-vm.ie.oracle.com Signed-off-by:
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KarimAllah Ahmed authored
commit 9005c683 upstream. [dwmw2: Use ARRAY_SIZE] Signed-off-by:
KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de> Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit 66f79309 upstream. There's no point in building init code with retpolines, since it runs before any potentially hostile userspace does. And before the retpoline is actually ALTERNATIVEd into place, for much of it. Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 085331df upstream. Commit 75f139aa "KVM: x86: Add memory barrier on vmcs field lookup" added a raw 'asm("lfence");' to prevent a bounds check bypass of 'vmcs_field_to_offset_table'. The lfence can be avoided in this path by using the array_index_nospec() helper designed for these types of fixes. Signed-off-by:
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com> Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151744959670.6342.3001723920950249067.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Replace max_vmcs_field with the local size variable - Adjust context] Signed-off-by:
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Josh Poimboeuf authored
commit 12c69f1e upstream. The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by:
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by:
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Colin Ian King authored
commit e698dcdf upstream. Trivial fix to spelling mistake in pr_err error message text. Signed-off-by:
Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit edfbae53 upstream. Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim mitigation for __user pointer de-references. Reported-by:
Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 259d8c1e upstream. Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, array_index_nospec(), to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS). Reported-by:
Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com> Reported-by:
Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727419584.33451.7700736761686184303.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit 56c30ba7 upstream. 'fd' is a user controlled value that is used as a data dependency to read from the 'fdt->fd' array. In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue reads based on an invalid 'file *' returned from __fcheck_files. Co-developed-by:
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Ben Hutchings authored
commit 2fbd7af5 upstream. The upstream version of this, touching C code, was written by Dan Williams, with the following description: > The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel > space. Use array_index_nospec() to prevent any out of bounds speculation. > > While retpoline prevents speculating into a userspace directed target it > does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern is leaking memory > relative to the syscall table base, by observing instruction cache > behavior. The x86_64 assembly version for 4.4 was written by Jiri Slaby, with the following description: > In 4.4.118, we have commit c8961332 (x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall > table de-references under speculation), which is a backport of upstream > commit 2fbd7af5 . But it fixed only the C part of the upstream patch > -- the IA32 sysentry. So it ommitted completely the assembly part -- the > 64bit sysentry. > > Fix that in this patch by explicit array_index_mask_nospec written in > assembly. The same was used in lib/getuser.S. > > However, to have "sbb" working properly, we have to switch from "cmp" > against (NR_syscalls-1) to (NR_syscalls), otherwise the last syscall > number would be "and"ed by 0. It is because the original "ja" relies on > "CF" or "ZF", but we rely only on "CF" in "sbb". That means: switch to > "jae" conditional jump too. > > Final note: use rcx for mask as this is exactly what is overwritten by > the 4th syscall argument (r10) right after. In 3.16 the x86_32 syscall table lookup is also written in assembly. So I've taken Jiri's version and added similar masking in entry_32.S, using edx as the temporary. edx is clobbered by SAVE_REGS and seems to be free at this point. The ia32 compat syscall table lookup on x86_64 is also written in assembly, so I've added the same masking in ia32entry.S, using r8 as the temporary since it is always clobbered by the following instructions. Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Cc: Jinpu Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit c7f631cb upstream. Quoting Linus: I do think that it would be a good idea to very expressly document the fact that it's not that the user access itself is unsafe. I do agree that things like "get_user()" want to be protected, but not because of any direct bugs or problems with get_user() and friends, but simply because get_user() is an excellent source of a pointer that is obviously controlled from a potentially attacking user space. So it's a prime candidate for then finding _subsequent_ accesses that can then be used to perturb the cache. Unlike the __get_user() case get_user() includes the address limit check near the pointer de-reference. With that locality the speculation can be mitigated with pointer narrowing rather than a barrier, i.e. array_index_nospec(). Where the narrowing is performed by: cmp %limit, %ptr sbb %mask, %mask and %mask, %ptr With respect to speculation the value of %ptr is either less than %limit or NULL. Co-developed-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit b3d7ad85 upstream. Rename the open coded form of this instruction sequence from rdtsc_ordered() into a generic barrier primitive, barrier_nospec(). One of the mitigations for Spectre variant1 vulnerabilities is to fence speculative execution after successfully validating a bounds check. I.e. force the result of a bounds check to resolve in the instruction pipeline to ensure speculative execution honors that result before potentially operating on out-of-bounds data. No functional changes. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit babdde26 upstream. array_index_nospec() uses a mask to sanitize user controllable array indexes, i.e. generate a 0 mask if 'index' >= 'size', and a ~0 mask otherwise. While the default array_index_mask_nospec() handles the carry-bit from the (index - size) result in software. The x86 array_index_mask_nospec() does the same, but the carry-bit is handled in the processor CF flag without conditional instructions in the control flow. Suggested-by:
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Dan Williams authored
commit f3804203 upstream. array_index_nospec() is proposed as a generic mechanism to mitigate against Spectre-variant-1 attacks, i.e. an attack that bypasses boundary checks via speculative execution. The array_index_nospec() implementation is expected to be safe for current generation CPUs across multiple architectures (ARM, x86). Based on an original implementation by Linus Torvalds, tweaked to remove speculative flows by Alexei Starovoitov, and tweaked again by Linus to introduce an x86 assembly implementation for the mask generation. Co-developed-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Suggested-by:
Cyril Novikov <cnovikov@lynx.com> Signed-off-by:
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Mark Rutland authored
commit f84a56f7 upstream. Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by:
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Dou Liyang authored
commit 9471eee9 upstream. The spectre_v2 option 'auto' does not check whether CONFIG_RETPOLINE is enabled. As a consequence it fails to emit the appropriate warning and sets feature flags which have no effect at all. Add the missing IS_ENABLED() check. Fixes: da285121 ("x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation") Signed-off-by:
Dou Liyang <douly.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by:
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Thomas Gleixner authored
commit e383095c upstream. If sysfs is disabled and RETPOLINE not defined: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:97:13: warning: ‘spectre_v2_bad_module’ defined but not used [-Wunused-variable] static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; Hide it. Fixes: caf7501a ("module/retpoline: Warn about missing retpoline in module") Reported-by:
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 55fa19d3 upstream. Make [ 0.031118] Spectre V2 mitigation: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline into [ 0.031118] Spectre V2: Mitigation: Full generic retpoline to reduce the mitigation mitigations strings. Signed-off-by:
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Borislav Petkov authored
commit 7a32fc51 upstream. ... to adhere to the _ASM_X86_ naming scheme. No functional change. Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
commit caf7501a upstream. There's a risk that a kernel which has full retpoline mitigations becomes vulnerable when a module gets loaded that hasn't been compiled with the right compiler or the right option. To enable detection of that mismatch at module load time, add a module info string "retpoline" at build time when the module was compiled with retpoline support. This only covers compiled C source, but assembler source or prebuilt object files are not checked. If a retpoline enabled kernel detects a non retpoline protected module at load time, print a warning and report it in the sysfs vulnerability file. [ tglx: Massaged changelog ] Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit c940a3fb upstream. Replace indirect call with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
commit 1a29b5b7 upstream. Replace the indirect calls with CALL_NOSPEC. Signed-off-by:
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Waiman Long authored
commit 1df37383 upstream. It doesn't make sense to have an indirect call thunk with esp/rsp as retpoline code won't work correctly with the stack pointer register. Removing it will help compiler writers to catch error in case such a thunk call is emitted incorrectly. Fixes: 76b04384 ("x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support") Suggested-by:
Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Gustavo A. R. Silva authored
commit 24dbc600 upstream. Currently, x86_cache_size is of type int, which makes no sense as we will never have a valid cache size equal or less than 0. So instead of initializing this variable to -1, it can perfectly be initialized to 0 and use it as an unsigned variable instead. Suggested-by:
Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1464429 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180213192208.GA26414@embeddedor.com Signed-off-by:
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David Woodhouse authored
commit c995efd5 upstream. On context switch from a shallow call stack to a deeper one, as the CPU does 'ret' up the deeper side it may encounter RSB entries (predictions for where the 'ret' goes to) which were populated in userspace. This is problematic if neither SMEP nor KPTI (the latter of which marks userspace pages as NX for the kernel) are active, as malicious code in userspace may then be executed speculatively. Overwrite the CPU's return prediction stack with calls which are predicted to return to an infinite loop, to "capture" speculation if this happens. This is required both for retpoline, and also in conjunction with IBRS for !SMEP && !KPTI. On Skylake+ the problem is slightly different, and an *underflow* of the RSB may cause errant branch predictions to occur. So there it's not so much overwrite, as *filling* the RSB to attempt to prevent it getting empty. This is only a partial solution for Skylake+ since there are many other conditions which may result in the RSB becoming empty. The full solution on Skylake+ is to use IBRS, which will prevent the problem even when the RSB becomes empty. With IBRS, the RSB-stuffing will not be required on context switch. [ tglx: Added missing vendor check and slighty massaged comments and changelog ] [js] backport to 4.4 -- __switch_to_asm does not exist there, we have to patch the switch_to macros for both x86_32 and x86_64. Signed-off-by:
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515779365-9032-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by:
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Dave Hansen authored
commit 970442c5 upstream. Problem: We have a boatload of open-coded family-6 model numbers. Half of them have these model numbers in hex and the other half in decimal. This makes grepping for them tons of fun, if you were to try. Solution: Consolidate all the magic numbers. Put all the definitions in one header. The names here are closely derived from the comments describing the models from arch/x86/events/intel/core.c. We could easily make them shorter by doing things like s/SANDYBRIDGE/SNB/, but they seemed fine even with the longer versions to me. Do not take any of these names too literally, like "DESKTOP" or "MOBILE". These are all colloquial names and not precise descriptions of everywhere a given model will show up. Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Doug Thompson <dougthompson@xmission.com> Cc: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@intel.com> Cc: Len Brown <lenb@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Rajneesh Bhardwaj <rajneesh.bhardwaj@intel.com> Cc: Souvik Kumar Chakravarty <souvik.k.chakravarty@intel.com> Cc: Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com> Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Cc: Vishwanath Somayaji <vishwanath.somayaji@intel.com> Cc: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> Cc: jacob.jun.pan@intel.com Cc: linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-edac@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-mmc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160603001927.F2A7D828@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by:
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Andi Kleen authored
commit 3f7d8755 upstream. The generated assembler for the C fill RSB inline asm operations has several issues: - The C code sets up the loop register, which is then immediately overwritten in __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER with the same value again. - The C code also passes in the iteration count in another register, which is not used at all. Remove these two unnecessary operations. Just rely on the single constant passed to the macro for the iterations. Signed-off-by:
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zhenwei.pi authored
commit 98f0fcee upstream. In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index. Signed-off-by:
zhenwei.pi <zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com> Signed-off-by:
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