- 21 Oct, 2017 28 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
This reverts commit 09610721 which is commit 1a5c2d1d upstream. Ben writes: This fixes a bug introduced in 4.6 by commit 465893e1 "tty: goldfish: support platform_device with id -1". For earlier kernel versions, it *introduces* a bug. So let's drop it. Reported-by:
Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
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Varun Prakash authored
[ Upstream commit 4d65491c ] In case of unsolicited data for the first sequence seq_end_offset must be set to minimum of total data length and FirstBurstLength, so do not add cmd->write_data_done to the min of total data length and FirstBurstLength. This patch avoids that with ImmediateData=Yes, InitialR2T=No, MaxXmitDataSegmentLength < FirstBurstLength that a WRITE command with IO size above FirstBurstLength triggers sequence error messages, for example Set following parameters on target (linux-4.8.12) ImmediateData = Yes InitialR2T = No MaxXmitDataSegmentLength = 8k FirstBurstLength = 64k Log in from Open iSCSI initiator and execute dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sdb bs=128k count=1 oflag=direct Error messages on target Command ITT: 0x00000035 with Offset: 65536, Length: 8192 outside of Sequence 73728:131072 while DataSequenceInOrder=Yes. Command ITT: 0x00000035, received DataSN: 0x00000001 higher than expected 0x00000000. Unable to perform within-command recovery while ERL=0. Signed-off-by:
Varun Prakash <varun@chelsio.com> [ bvanassche: Use min() instead of open-coding it / edited patch description ] Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com> Signed-off-by:
Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Dmitry V. Levin authored
[ Upstream commit 72aa107d ] Include <linux/in6.h> to fix the following linux/mroute6.h userspace compilation errors: /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:80:22: error: field 'mf6cc_origin' has incomplete type struct sockaddr_in6 mf6cc_origin; /* Origin of mcast */ /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:81:22: error: field 'mf6cc_mcastgrp' has incomplete type struct sockaddr_in6 mf6cc_mcastgrp; /* Group in question */ /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:91:22: error: field 'src' has incomplete type struct sockaddr_in6 src; /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:92:22: error: field 'grp' has incomplete type struct sockaddr_in6 grp; /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:132:18: error: field 'im6_src' has incomplete type struct in6_addr im6_src, im6_dst; /usr/include/linux/mroute6.h:132:27: error: field 'im6_dst' has incomplete type struct in6_addr im6_src, im6_dst; Signed-off-by:
Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by:
David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by:
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Dmitry V. Levin authored
[ Upstream commit feb0869d ] Consistently use types from linux/types.h to fix the following linux/rds.h userspace compilation errors: /usr/include/linux/rds.h:106:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t name[32]; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:107:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t value; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:117:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t next_tx_seq; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:118:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t next_rx_seq; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:121:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t transport[TRANSNAMSIZ]; /* null term ascii */ /usr/include/linux/rds.h:122:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:129:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t seq; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:130:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t len; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:135:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:139:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t sndbuf; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:144:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t rcvbuf; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:145:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t inum; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:153:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t hdr_rem; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:154:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t data_rem; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:155:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t last_sent_nxt; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:156:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t last_expected_una; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:157:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t last_seen_una; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:164:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t src_gid[RDS_IB_GID_LEN]; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:165:2: error: unknown type name 'uint8_t' uint8_t dst_gid[RDS_IB_GID_LEN]; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:167:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t max_send_wr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:168:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t max_recv_wr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:169:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t max_send_sge; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:170:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t rdma_mr_max; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:171:2: error: unknown type name 'uint32_t' uint32_t rdma_mr_size; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:212:9: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' typedef uint64_t rds_rdma_cookie_t; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:215:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:216:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t bytes; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:221:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t cookie_addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:222:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:228:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t cookie_addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:229:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:234:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:240:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t local_vec_addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:241:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t nr_local; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:242:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:243:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t user_token; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:248:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t local_addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:249:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t remote_addr; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:252:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t compare; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:253:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t swap; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:256:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t add; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:259:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t compare; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:260:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t swap; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:261:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t compare_mask; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:262:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t swap_mask; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:265:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t add; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:266:4: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t nocarry_mask; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:269:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t flags; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:270:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t user_token; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:274:2: error: unknown type name 'uint64_t' uint64_t user_token; /usr/include/linux/rds.h:275:2: error: unknown type name 'int32_t' int32_t status; Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit 4d7d39a1 ] We accidentally return an uninitialized variable on success. Fixes: b6ff1b14 ("[SCSI] scsi_dh: Update EMC handler") Signed-off-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Ren authored
[ Upstream commit 439a36b8 ] We are in the situation that we have to avoid recursive cluster locking, but there is no way to check if a cluster lock has been taken by a precess already. Mostly, we can avoid recursive locking by writing code carefully. However, we found that it's very hard to handle the routines that are invoked directly by vfs code. For instance: const struct inode_operations ocfs2_file_iops = { .permission = ocfs2_permission, .get_acl = ocfs2_iop_get_acl, .set_acl = ocfs2_iop_set_acl, }; Both ocfs2_permission() and ocfs2_iop_get_acl() call ocfs2_inode_lock(PR): do_sys_open may_open inode_permission ocfs2_permission ocfs2_inode_lock() <=== first time generic_permission get_acl ocfs2_iop_get_acl ocfs2_inode_lock() <=== recursive one A deadlock will occur if a remote EX request comes in between two of ocfs2_inode_lock(). Briefly describe how the deadlock is formed: On one hand, OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag of this lockres is set in BAST(ocfs2_generic_handle_bast) when downconvert is started on behalf of the remote EX lock request. Another hand, the recursive cluster lock (the second one) will be blocked in in __ocfs2_cluster_lock() because of OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED. But, the downconvert never complete, why? because there is no chance for the first cluster lock on this node to be unlocked - we block ourselves in the code path. The idea to fix this issue is mostly taken from gfs2 code. 1. introduce a new field: struct ocfs2_lock_res.l_holders, to keep track of the processes' pid who has taken the cluster lock of this lock resource; 2. introduce a new flag for ocfs2_inode_lock_full: OCFS2_META_LOCK_GETBH; it means just getting back disk inode bh for us if we've got cluster lock. 3. export a helper: ocfs2_is_locked_by_me() is used to check if we have got the cluster lock in the upper code path. The tracking logic should be used by some of the ocfs2 vfs's callbacks, to solve the recursive locking issue cuased by the fact that vfs routines can call into each other. The performance penalty of processing the holder list should only be seen at a few cases where the tracking logic is used, such as get/set acl. You may ask what if the first time we got a PR lock, and the second time we want a EX lock? fortunately, this case never happens in the real world, as far as I can see, including permission check, (get|set)_(acl|attr), and the gfs2 code also do so. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au remove some inlines] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117100948.11657-2-zren@suse.com Signed-off-by:
Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by:
Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Milan Broz authored
[ Upstream commit 12cb3a1c ] Since the commit f1c131b4 crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher the XTS mode is based on ECB, so the mode must select ECB otherwise it can fail to initialize. Signed-off-by:
Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by:
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Majd Dibbiny authored
[ Upstream commit 95f1ba9a ] In the VF driver, module parameter mlx4_log_num_mgm_entry_size was mistakenly overwritten -- and in a manner which overrode the device-managed flow steering option encoded in the parameter. log_num_mgm_entry_size is a global module parameter which affects all ConnectX-3 PFs installed on that host. If a VF changes log_num_mgm_entry_size, this will affect all PFs which are probed subsequent to the change (by disabling DMFS for those PFs). Fixes: 3c439b55 ("mlx4_core: Allow choosing flow steering mode") Signed-off-by:
Majd Dibbiny <majd@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by:
Jack Morgenstein <jackm@dev.mellanox.co.il> Signed-off-by:
Tariq Toukan <tariqt@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by:
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Robbie Ko authored
[ Upstream commit 4dd9920d ] Under certain situations, an incremental send operation can fail due to a premature attempt to create a new top level inode (a direct child of the subvolume/snapshot root) whose name collides with another inode that was removed from the send snapshot. Consider the following example scenario. Parent snapshot: . (ino 256, gen 8) |---- a1/ (ino 257, gen 9) |---- a2/ (ino 258, gen 9) Send snapshot: . (ino 256, gen 3) |---- a2/ (ino 257, gen 7) In this scenario, when receiving the incremental send stream, the btrfs receive command fails like this (ran in verbose mode, -vv argument): rmdir a1 mkfile o257-7-0 rename o257-7-0 -> a2 ERROR: rename o257-7-0 -> a2 failed: Is a directory What happens when computing the incremental send stream is: 1) An operation to remove the directory with inode number 257 and generation 9 is issued. 2) An operation to create the inode with number 257 and generation 7 is issued. This creates the inode with an orphanized name of "o257-7-0". 3) An operation rename the new inode 257 to its final name, "a2", is issued. This is incorrect because inode 258, which has the same name and it's a child of the same parent (root inode 256), was not yet processed and therefore no rmdir operation for it was yet issued. The rename operation is issued because we fail to detect that the name of the new inode 257 collides with inode 258, because their parent, a subvolume/snapshot root (inode 256) has a different generation in both snapshots. So fix this by ignoring the generation value of a parent directory that matches a root inode (number 256) when we are checking if the name of the inode currently being processed collides with the name of some other inode that was not yet processed. We can achieve this scenario of different inodes with the same number but different generation values either by mounting a filesystem with the inode cache option (-o inode_cache) or by creating and sending snapshots across different filesystems, like in the following example: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt $ mkdir /mnt/a1 $ mkdir /mnt/a2 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap1 $ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/1.snap $ umount /mnt $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt $ touch /mnt/a2 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap2 $ btrfs receive /mnt -f /tmp/1.snap # Take note that once the filesystem is created, its current # generation has value 7 so the inode from the second snapshot has # a generation value of 7. And after receiving the first snapshot # the filesystem is at a generation value of 10, because the call to # create the second snapshot bumps the generation to 8 (the snapshot # creation ioctl does a transaction commit), the receive command calls # the snapshot creation ioctl to create the first snapshot, which bumps # the filesystem's generation to 9, and finally when the receive # operation finishes it calls an ioctl to transition the first snapshot # (snap1) from RW mode to RO mode, which does another transaction commit # and bumps the filesystem's generation to 10. $ rm -f /tmp/1.snap $ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/1.snap $ btrfs send -p /mnt/snap1 /mnt/snap2 -f /tmp/2.snap $ umount /mnt $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd $ mount /dev/sdd /mnt $ btrfs receive /mnt /tmp/1.snap # Receive of snapshot snap2 used to fail. $ btrfs receive /mnt /tmp/2.snap Signed-off-by:
Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com> Reviewed-by:
Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> [Rewrote changelog to be more precise and clear] Signed-off-by:
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Christophe JAILLET authored
[ Upstream commit ca1c39ef ] Reorder error handling labels in order to match the way resources have been allocated. Signed-off-by:
Christophe JAILLET <christophe.jaillet@wanadoo.fr> Acked-by:
Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de> Signed-off-by:
Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jarno Rajahalme authored
[ Upstream commit 4b86c459 ] Commit 4dee62b1 ("netfilter: nf_ct_expect: nf_ct_expect_insert() returns void") inadvertently changed the successful return value of nf_ct_expect_related_report() from 0 to 1 due to __nf_ct_expect_check() returning 1 on success. Prevent this regression in the future by changing the return value of __nf_ct_expect_check() to 0 on success. Signed-off-by:
Jarno Rajahalme <jarno@ovn.org> Acked-by:
Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org> Signed-off-by:
Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by:
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Franck Demathieu authored
[ Upstream commit b28ace12 ] The max and entry variables are unsigned according to the dt-bindings. Fix following 3 sparse issues (-Wtypesign): drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:222:52: warning: incorrect type in argument 3 (different signedness) drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:222:52: expected unsigned int [usertype] *out_value drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:222:52: got int *<noident> drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:245:56: warning: incorrect type in argument 4 (different signedness) drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:245:56: expected unsigned int [usertype] *out_value drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:245:56: got int *<noident> drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:263:56: warning: incorrect type in argument 4 (different signedness) drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:263:56: expected unsigned int [usertype] *out_value drivers/irqchip/irq-crossbar.c:263:56: got int *<noident> Signed-off-by:
Franck Demathieu <fdemathieu@gmail.com> Cc: marc.zyngier@arm.com Cc: jason@lakedaemon.net Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170223094855.6546-1-fdemathieu@gmail.com Signed-off-by:
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by:
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Arnd Bergmann authored
[ Upstream commit 3736d4eb ] gcc-4.3 can't decide whether the constant value in kempld_prescaler[PRESCALER_21] is built-time constant or not, and gets confused by the logic in do_div(): drivers/watchdog/kempld_wdt.o: In function `kempld_wdt_set_stage_timeout': kempld_wdt.c:(.text.kempld_wdt_set_stage_timeout+0x130): undefined reference to `__aeabi_uldivmod' This adds a call to ACCESS_ONCE() to force it to not consider it to be constant, and leaves the more efficient normal case in place for modern compilers, using an #ifdef to annotate why we do this hack. Signed-off-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit 7fb4a2ce ] Boqun reported that hlock->references can overflow. Add a debug test for that to generate a clear error when this happens. Without this, lockdep is likely to report a mysterious failure on unlock. Reported-by:
Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nicolai Hähnle <Nicolai.Haehnle@amd.com> Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
This reverts commit d9100405 which was commit f507b54d upstream. Ben reports: That function doesn't exist here (it was introduced in 4.13). Instead, this backport has modified bsg_create_job(), creating a leak. Please revert this on the 3.18, 4.4 and 4.9 stable branches. So I'm dropping it from here. Reported-by:
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Christoph Paasch authored
[ Upstream commit 9d538fa6 ] sk->sk_prot and sk->sk_prot_creator can differ when the app uses IPV6_ADDRFORM (transforming an IPv6-socket to an IPv4-one). Which is why sk_prot_creator is there to make sure that sk_prot_free() does the kmem_cache_free() on the right kmem_cache slab. Now, if such a socket gets transformed back to a listening socket (using connect() with AF_UNSPEC) we will allocate an IPv4 tcp_sock through sk_clone_lock() when a new connection comes in. But sk_prot_creator will still point to the IPv6 kmem_cache (as everything got copied in sk_clone_lock()). When freeing, we will thus put this memory back into the IPv6 kmem_cache although it was allocated in the IPv4 cache. I have seen memory corruption happening because of this. With slub-debugging and MEMCG_KMEM enabled this gives the warning "cache_from_obj: Wrong slab cache. TCPv6 but object is from TCP" A C-program to trigger this: void main(void) { int fd = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); int new_fd, newest_fd, client_fd; struct sockaddr_in6 bind_addr; struct sockaddr_in bind_addr4, client_addr1, client_addr2; struct sockaddr unsp; int val; memset(&bind_addr, 0, sizeof(bind_addr)); bind_addr.sin6_family = AF_INET6; bind_addr.sin6_port = ntohs(42424); memset(&client_addr1, 0, sizeof(client_addr1)); client_addr1.sin_family = AF_INET; client_addr1.sin_port = ntohs(42424); client_addr1.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); memset(&client_addr2, 0, sizeof(client_addr2)); client_addr2.sin_family = AF_INET; client_addr2.sin_port = ntohs(42421); client_addr2.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr("127.0.0.1"); memset(&unsp, 0, sizeof(unsp)); unsp.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; bind(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr, sizeof(bind_addr)); listen(fd, 5); client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr1, sizeof(client_addr1)); new_fd = accept(fd, NULL, NULL); close(fd); val = AF_INET; setsockopt(new_fd, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_ADDRFORM, &val, sizeof(val)); connect(new_fd, &unsp, sizeof(unsp)); memset(&bind_addr4, 0, sizeof(bind_addr4)); bind_addr4.sin_family = AF_INET; bind_addr4.sin_port = ntohs(42421); bind(new_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&bind_addr4, sizeof(bind_addr4)); listen(new_fd, 5); client_fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP); connect(client_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&client_addr2, sizeof(client_addr2)); newest_fd = accept(new_fd, NULL, NULL); close(new_fd); close(client_fd); close(new_fd); } As far as I can see, this bug has been there since the beginning of the git-days. Signed-off-by:
Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com> Reviewed-by:
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 4971613c ] Once a socket has po->fanout set, it remains a member of the group until it is destroyed. The prot_hook must be constant and identical across sockets in the group. If fanout_add races with packet_do_bind between the test of po->fanout and taking the lock, the bind call may make type or dev inconsistent with that of the fanout group. Hold po->bind_lock when testing po->fanout to avoid this race. I had to introduce artificial delay (local_bh_enable) to actually observe the race. Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.") Signed-off-by:
Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Reviewed-by:
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Sabrina Dubroca authored
[ Upstream commit 62b982ee ] If we try to delete the same tunnel twice, the first delete operation does a lookup (l2tp_tunnel_get), finds the tunnel, calls l2tp_tunnel_delete, which queues it for deletion by l2tp_tunnel_del_work. The second delete operation also finds the tunnel and calls l2tp_tunnel_delete. If the workqueue has already fired and started running l2tp_tunnel_del_work, then l2tp_tunnel_delete will queue the same tunnel a second time, and try to free the socket again. Add a dead flag to prevent firing the workqueue twice. Then we can remove the check of queue_work's result that was meant to prevent that race but doesn't. Reproducer: ip l2tp add tunnel tunnel_id 3000 peer_tunnel_id 4000 local 192.168.0.2 remote 192.168.0.1 encap udp udp_sport 5000 udp_dport 6000 ip l2tp add session name l2tp1 tunnel_id 3000 session_id 1000 peer_session_id 2000 ip link set l2tp1 up ip l2tp del tunnel tunnel_id 3000 ip l2tp del tunnel tunnel_id 3000 Fixes: f8ccac0e ("l2tp: put tunnel socket release on a workqueue") Reported-by:
Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Acked-by:
Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr> Signed-off-by:
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Ridge Kennedy authored
[ Upstream commit 12d656af ] While destroying a network namespace that contains a L2TP tunnel a "BUG: scheduling while atomic" can be observed. Enabling lockdep shows that this is happening because l2tp_exit_net() is calling l2tp_tunnel_closeall() (via l2tp_tunnel_delete()) from within an RCU critical section. l2tp_exit_net() takes rcu_read_lock_bh() << list_for_each_entry_rcu() >> l2tp_tunnel_delete() l2tp_tunnel_closeall() __l2tp_session_unhash() synchronize_rcu() << Illegal inside RCU critical section >> BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 86, name: kworker/u16:2 INFO: lockdep is turned off. CPU: 2 PID: 86 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W O 4.4.6-at1 #2 Hardware name: Xen HVM domU, BIOS 4.6.1-xs125300 05/09/2016 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net 0000000000000000 ffff880202417b90 ffffffff812b0013 ffff880202410ac0 ffffffff81870de8 ffff880202417bb8 ffffffff8107aee8 ffffffff81870de8 0000000000000c51 0000000000000000 ffff880202417be0 ffffffff8107b024 Call Trace: [<ffffffff812b0013>] dump_stack+0x85/0xc2 [<ffffffff8107aee8>] ___might_sleep+0x148/0x240 [<ffffffff8107b024>] __might_sleep+0x44/0x80 [<ffffffff810b21bd>] synchronize_sched+0x2d/0xe0 [<ffffffff8109be6d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10 [<ffffffff8105c7bb>] ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0x6b/0xc0 [<ffffffff816a1b00>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_bh+0x30/0x40 [<ffffffff81667482>] __l2tp_session_unhash+0x172/0x220 [<ffffffff81667397>] ? __l2tp_session_unhash+0x87/0x220 [<ffffffff8166888b>] l2tp_tunnel_closeall+0x9b/0x140 [<ffffffff81668c74>] l2tp_tunnel_delete+0x14/0x60 [<ffffffff81668dd0>] l2tp_exit_net+0x110/0x270 [<ffffffff81668d5c>] ? l2tp_exit_net+0x9c/0x270 [<ffffffff815001c3>] ops_exit_list.isra.6+0x33/0x60 [<ffffffff81501166>] cleanup_net+0x1b6/0x280 ... This bug can easily be reproduced with a few steps: $ sudo unshare -n bash # Create a shell in a new namespace # ip link set lo up # ip addr add 127.0.0.1 dev lo # ip l2tp add tunnel remote 127.0.0.1 local 127.0.0.1 tunnel_id 1 \ peer_tunnel_id 1 udp_sport 50000 udp_dport 50000 # ip l2tp add session name foo tunnel_id 1 session_id 1 \ peer_session_id 1 # ip link set foo up # exit # Exit the shell, in turn exiting the namespace $ dmesg ... [942121.089216] BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u16:3/13872/0x00000200 ... To fix this, move the call to l2tp_tunnel_closeall() out of the RCU critical section, and instead call it from l2tp_tunnel_del_work(), which is running from the l2tp_wq workqueue. Fixes: 2b551c6e ("l2tp: close sessions before initiating tunnel delete") Signed-off-by:
Ridge Kennedy <ridge.kennedy@alliedtelesis.co.nz> Acked-by:
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Alexey Kodanev authored
[ Upstream commit 36f6ee22 ] When running LTP IPsec tests, KASan might report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880dc6ad1980 by task swapper/0/0 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x63/0x89 print_address_description+0x7c/0x290 kasan_report+0x28d/0x370 ? vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x19/0x20 vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] ? vti_init_net+0x190/0x190 [ip_vti] ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x147/0x510 ? icmp_echo.part.24+0x1f0/0x210 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1394/0x1c60 ... Freed by task 0: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_slab_free+0x70/0xc0 kmem_cache_free+0x81/0x1e0 kfree_skbmem+0xb1/0xe0 kfree_skb+0x75/0x170 kfree_skb_list+0x3e/0x60 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1298/0x1c60 dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20 neigh_resolve_output+0x3a8/0x740 ip_finish_output2+0x5c0/0xe70 ip_finish_output+0x4ba/0x680 ip_output+0x1c1/0x3a0 xfrm_output_resume+0xc65/0x13d0 xfrm_output+0x1e4/0x380 xfrm4_output_finish+0x5c/0x70 Can be fixed if we get skb->len before dst_output(). Fixes: b9959fd3 ("vti: switch to new ip tunnel code") Fixes: 22e1b23d ("vti6: Support inter address family tunneling.") Signed-off-by:
Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Meng Xu authored
[ Upstream commit 02388bf8 ] In isdn_ppp_write(), the header (i.e., protobuf) of the buffer is fetched twice from userspace. The first fetch is used to peek at the protocol of the message and reset the huptimer if necessary; while the second fetch copies in the whole buffer. However, given that buf resides in userspace memory, a user process can race to change its memory content across fetches. By doing so, we can either avoid resetting the huptimer for any type of packets (by first setting proto to PPP_LCP and later change to the actual type) or force resetting the huptimer for LCP packets. This patch changes this double-fetch behavior into two single fetches decided by condition (lp->isdn_device < 0 || lp->isdn_channel <0). A more detailed discussion can be found at https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150586376926123&w=2 Signed-off-by:
Meng Xu <mengxu.gatech@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Willem de Bruijn authored
[ Upstream commit 008ba2a1 ] Packet socket bind operations must hold the po->bind_lock. This keeps po->running consistent with whether the socket is actually on a ptype list to receive packets. fanout_add unbinds a socket and its packet_rcv/tpacket_rcv call, then binds the fanout object to receive through packet_rcv_fanout. Make it hold the po->bind_lock when testing po->running and rebinding. Else, it can race with other rebind operations, such as that in packet_set_ring from packet_rcv to tpacket_rcv. Concurrent updates can result in a socket being added to a fanout group twice, causing use-after-free KASAN bug reports, among others. Reported independently by both trinity and syzkaller. Verified that the syzkaller reproducer passes after this patch. Fixes: dc99f600 ("packet: Add fanout support.") Reported-by:
nixioaming <nixiaoming@huawei.com> Signed-off-by:
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Edward Cree authored
[ Upstream commit e67b8a68 ] Neither ___bpf_prog_run nor the JITs accept it. Also adds a new test case. Fixes: 17a52670 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)") Signed-off-by:
Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Acked-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
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Dan Carpenter authored
[ Upstream commit fa5f7b51 ] This code causes a static checker warning because Smatch doesn't trust anything that comes from skb->data. I've reviewed this code and I do think skb->data can be controlled by the user here. The sctp_event_subscribe struct has 13 __u8 fields and we want to see if ours is non-zero. sn_type can be any value in the 0-USHRT_MAX range. We're subtracting SCTP_SN_TYPE_BASE which is 1 << 15 so we could read either before the start of the struct or after the end. This is a very old bug and it's surprising that it would go undetected for so long but my theory is that it just doesn't have a big impact so it would be hard to notice. Signed-off-by:
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Jan Kara authored
[ Upstream commit 2e81a4ee ] When we need to move xattrs into external xattr block, we call ext4_xattr_block_set() from ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea(). That may end up calling ext4_mark_inode_dirty() again which will recurse back into the inode expansion code leading to deadlocks. Protect from recursion using EXT4_STATE_NO_EXPAND inode flag and move its management into ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea() since its manipulation is safe there (due to xattr_sem) from possible races with ext4_xattr_set_handle() which plays with it as well. Signed-off-by:
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by:
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Harry Wentland authored
commit 6cecdf7a upstream. This makes it possibly for drivers to find the associated mst_port by looking at the payload allocation table. Signed-off-by:
Harry Wentland <harry.wentland@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1449514552-10236-3-git-send-email-harry.wentland@amd.com Signed-off-by:
Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch> Cc: Kai Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior authored
commit 5cf0791d upstream. There's a subtle preemption race on UP kernels: Usually current->mm (and therefore mm->pgd) stays the same during the lifetime of a task so it does not matter if a task gets preempted during the read and write of the CR3. But then, there is this scenario on x86-UP: TaskA is in do_exit() and exit_mm() sets current->mm = NULL followed by: -> mmput() -> exit_mmap() -> tlb_finish_mmu() -> tlb_flush_mmu() -> tlb_flush_mmu_tlbonly() -> tlb_flush() -> flush_tlb_mm_range() -> __flush_tlb_up() -> __flush_tlb() -> __native_flush_tlb() At this point current->mm is NULL but current->active_mm still points to the "old" mm. Let's preempt taskA _after_ native_read_cr3() by taskB. TaskB has its own mm so CR3 has changed. Now preempt back to taskA. TaskA has no ->mm set so it borrows taskB's mm and so CR3 remains unchanged. Once taskA gets active it continues where it was interrupted and that means it writes its old CR3 value back. Everything is fine because userland won't need its memory anymore. Now the fun part: Let's preempt taskA one more time and get back to taskB. This time switch_mm() won't do a thing because oldmm (->active_mm) is the same as mm (as per context_switch()). So we remain with a bad CR3 / PGD and return to userland. The next thing that happens is handle_mm_fault() with an address for the execution of its code in userland. handle_mm_fault() realizes that it has a PTE with proper rights so it returns doing nothing. But the CPU looks at the wrong PGD and insists that something is wrong and faults again. And again. And one more time… This pagefault circle continues until the scheduler gets tired of it and puts another task on the CPU. It gets little difficult if the task is a RT task with a high priority. The system will either freeze or it gets fixed by the software watchdog thread which usually runs at RT-max prio. But waiting for the watchdog will increase the latency of the RT task which is no good. Fix this by disabling preemption across the critical code section. Signed-off-by:
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Acked-by:
Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470404259-26290-1-git-send-email-bigeasy@linutronix.de [ Prettified the changelog. ] Signed-off-by:
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- 18 Oct, 2017 12 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
This reverts commit abb540b5 which is commit b7bd98b7 upstream. I had added it to make another patch apply cleanly, but as Ben points out, that was wrong. Reported-by:
kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com> Cc: David Eccher <d.eccher@gmail.com> Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@ti.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 030e2c78 upstream. snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear() unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL check. Reported-by:
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Tested-by:
Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Cc: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by:
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Johan Hovold authored
commit 299d7572 upstream. Make sure to reset the USB-console port pointer when console setup fails in order to avoid having the struct usb_serial be prematurely freed by the console code when the device is later disconnected. Fixes: 73e487fd ("[PATCH] USB console: fix disconnection issues") Acked-by:
Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Shrirang Bagul authored
commit f5d9644c upstream. Dell Wireless 5819/5818 devices are re-branded Sierra Wireless MC74 series which will by default boot with vid 0x413c and pid's 0x81cf, 0x81d0, 0x81d1, 0x81d2. Signed-off-by:
Shrirang Bagul <shrirang.bagul@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
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Henryk Heisig authored
commit 837ddc47 upstream. This commit adds support for TP-Link LTE mPCIe module is used in in TP-Link MR200v1, MR6400v1 and v2 routers. Signed-off-by:
Henryk Heisig <hyniu@o2.pl> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Engel authored
commit c496ad83 upstream. Add the USB device id for the ELV TFD500 data logger. Signed-off-by:
Andreas Engel <anen-nospam@gmx.net> Signed-off-by:
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Vitaly Mayatskikh authored
commit 95d78c28 upstream. bio_map_user_iov and bio_unmap_user do unbalanced pages refcounting if IO vector has small consecutive buffers belonging to the same page. bio_add_pc_page merges them into one, but the page reference is never dropped. Signed-off-by:
Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
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Andreas Gruenbacher authored
commit 899f0429 upstream. In the code added to function submit_page_section by commit b1058b98 , sdio->bio can currently be NULL when calling dio_bio_submit. This then leads to a NULL pointer access in dio_bio_submit, so check for a NULL bio in submit_page_section before trying to submit it instead. Fixes xfstest generic/250 on gfs2. Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
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Andrew Gabbasov authored
commit aec17e1e upstream. KASAN enabled configuration reports an error BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_composite_overwrite_options+... [libcomposite] at addr ... Read of size 1 by task ... when some driver is un-bound and then bound again. For example, this happens with FunctionFS driver when "ffs-test" test application is run several times in a row. If the driver has empty manufacturer ID string in initial static data, it is then replaced with generated string. After driver unbinding the generated string is freed, but the driver data still keep that pointer. And if the driver is then bound again, that pointer is re-used for string emptiness check. The fix is to clean up the driver string data upon its unbinding to drop the pointer to freed memory. Fixes: cc2683c3 ("usb: gadget: Provide a default implementation of default manufacturer string") Signed-off-by:
Andrew Gabbasov <andrew_gabbasov@mentor.com> Signed-off-by:
Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 99fee508 upstream. caiaq driver doesn't kill the URB properly at its error path during the probe, which may lead to a use-after-free error later. This patch addresses it. Reported-by:
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Takashi Iwai authored
commit 5803b023 upstream. The event handler in the virmidi sequencer code takes a read-lock for the linked list traverse, while it's calling snd_seq_dump_var_event() in the loop. The latter function may expand the user-space data depending on the event type. It eventually invokes copy_from_user(), which might be a potential dead-lock. The sequencer core guarantees that the user-space data is passed only with atomic=0 argument, but snd_virmidi_dev_receive_event() ignores it and always takes read-lock(). For avoiding the problem above, this patch introduces rwsem for non-atomic case, while keeping rwlock for atomic case. Also while we're at it: the superfluous irq flags is dropped in snd_virmidi_input_open(). Reported-by:
Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@163.com> Signed-off-by:
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