- 17 Apr, 2020 40 commits
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Greg Kroah-Hartman authored
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Julia Lawall authored
[ Upstream commit 7506baee ] The commit 0d6defc7 ("ASoC: stm32: sai: manage rebind issue") converts some function calls to their non-devm equivalents. The appropriate cleanup code was added to the remove function, but not to the probe function. Add a call to snd_dmaengine_pcm_unregister to compensate for the call to snd_dmaengine_pcm_register in case of subsequent failure. Fixes: commit 0d6defc7 ("ASoC: stm32: sai: manage rebind issue") Signed-off-by:
Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@inria.fr> Acked-by:
Olivier Moysan <olivier.moysan@st.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1586099028-5104-1-git-send-email-Julia.Lawall@inria.fr Signed-off-by:
Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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Gary Lin authored
[ Upstream commit a4b81ccf ] efi_thunk_set_variable() treated the NULL "data" pointer as an invalid parameter, and this broke the deletion of variables in mixed mode. This commit fixes the check of data so that the userspace program can delete a variable in mixed mode. Fixes: 8319e9d5 ("efi/x86: Handle by-ref arguments covering multiple pages in mixed mode") Signed-off-by:
Gary Lin <glin@suse.com> Signed-off-by:
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200408081606.1504-1-glin@suse.com Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200409130434.6736-9-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Andy Shevchenko authored
[ Upstream commit fb945c95 ] While the commit 2b8bd606 ("mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints") tries to harden the sanity checks it made at the same time a regression, i.e. mixed in and out endpoints. Obviously it should have been not tested on real hardware at that time, but unluckily it didn't happen. So, fix above mentioned typo and make device being enumerated again. While here, introduce an enumerator for magic values to prevent similar issue to happen in the future. Fixes: 2b8bd606 ("mfd: dln2: More sanity checking for endpoints") Cc: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Lee Jones <lee.jones@linaro.org> Signed-off-by:
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Jann Horn authored
[ Upstream commit 604dca5e ] The BPF verifier tried to track values based on 32-bit comparisons by (ab)using the tnum state via 581738a6 ("bpf: Provide better register bounds after jmp32 instructions"). The idea is that after a check like this: if ((u32)r0 > 3) exit We can't meaningfully constrain the arithmetic-range-based tracking, but we can update the tnum state to (value=0,mask=0xffff'ffff'0000'0003). However, the implementation from 581738a6 didn't compute the tnum constraint based on the fixed operand, but instead derives it from the arithmetic-range-based tracking. This means that after the following sequence of operations: if (r0 >= 0x1'0000'0001) exit if ((u32)r0 > 7) exit The verifier assumed that the lower half of r0 is in the range (0, 0) and apply the tnum constraint (value=0,mask=0xffff'ffff'0000'0000) thus causing the overall tnum to be (value=0,mask=0x1'0000'0000), which was incorrect. Provide a fixed implementation. Fixes: 581738a6 ("bpf: Provide better register bounds after jmp32 instructions") Signed-off-by:
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by:
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200330160324.15259-3-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
[ Upstream commit af92bad6 ] At the moment kasan_remap_early_shadow_ro() does nothing, because k_end is 0 and k_cur < 0 is always true. Change the test to k_cur != k_end, as done in kasan_init_shadow_page_tables() Signed-off-by:
Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Fixes: cbd18991 ("powerpc/mm: Fix an Oops in kasan_mmu_init()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4e7b56865e01569058914c991143f5961b5d4719.1583507333.git.christophe.leroy@c-s.fr Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit 2c2366c7 ] We can deduce the ctx and cpuctx from the event, no need to pass them along. Remove the structure and pass in can_add_hw directly. Signed-off-by:
Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit 33238c50 ] Song reports that installing cgroup events is broken since: db0503e4 ("perf/core: Optimize perf_install_in_event()") The problem being that cgroup events try to track cpuctx->cgrp even for disabled events, which is pointless and actively harmful since the above commit. Rework the code to have explicit enable/disable hooks for cgroup events, such that we can limit cgroup tracking to active events. More specifically, since the above commit disabled events are no longer added to their context from the 'right' CPU, and we can't access things like the current cgroup for a remote CPU. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.5+ Fixes: db0503e4 ("perf/core: Optimize perf_install_in_event()") Reported-by:
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Tested-by:
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Peter Zijlstra authored
[ Upstream commit ab6f824c ] Less is more; unify the two very nearly identical function. Signed-off-by:
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Chris Wilson authored
[ Upstream commit 0b72a251 ] When we allocate space in the GGTT we may have to allocate a larger region than will be populated by the object to accommodate fencing. Make sure that this space beyond the end of the buffer points safely into scratch space, in case the HW tries to access it anyway (e.g. fenced access to the last tile row). v2: Preemptively / conservatively guard gen6 ggtt as well. Reported-by:
Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> References: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/intel/-/issues/1554 Signed-off-by:
Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Cc: Imre Deak <imre.deak@intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by:
Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Rodrigo Vivi <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Daniele Ceraolo Spurio authored
[ Upstream commit 69edc390 ] On TGL, bits 2-4 in the GGTT PTE are not ignored anymore and are instead used for some extra VT-d capabilities. We don't (yet?) have support for those capabilities, but, given that we shared the pte_encode function betweed GGTT and PPGTT, we still set those bits to the PPGTT PPAT values. The DMA engine gets very confused when those bits are set while the iommu is enabled, leading to errors. E.g. when loading the GuC we get: [ 9.796218] DMAR: DRHD: handling fault status reg 2 [ 9.796235] DMAR: [DMA Write] Request device [00:02.0] PASID ffffffff fault addr 0 [fault reason 02] Present bit in context entry is clear [ 9.899215] [drm:intel_guc_fw_upload [i915]] *ERROR* GuC firmware signature verification failed To fix this, just have dedicated gen8_pte_encode function per type of gtt. Also, explicitly set vm->pte_encode for gen8_ppgtt, even if we don't use it, to make sure we don't accidentally assign it to the GGTT one, like we do for gen6_ppgtt, in case we need it in the future. Reported-by:
"Sodhi, Vunny" <vunny.sodhi@intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Daniele Ceraolo Spurio <daniele.ceraolospurio@intel.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Cc: Matthew Auld <matthew.auld@intel.com> Cc: Michal Wajdeczko <michal.wajdeczko@intel.com> Reviewed-by:
Mika Kuoppala <mika.kuoppala@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
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Prike Liang authored
[ Upstream commit 487eca11 ] The system will be hang up during S3 suspend because of SMU is pending for GC not respose the register CP_HQD_ACTIVE access request.This issue root cause of accessing the GC register under enter GFX CGGPG and can be fixed by disable GFX CGPG before perform suspend. v2: Use disable the GFX CGPG instead of RLC safe mode guard. Signed-off-by:
Prike Liang <Prike.Liang@amd.com> Tested-by:
Mengbing Wang <Mengbing.Wang@amd.com> Reviewed-by:
Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com> Signed-off-by:
Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit 8732fe46 ] The issues caused by: commit 64e62bdf ("drm/dp_mst: Remove VCPI while disabling topology mgr") Prompted me to take a closer look at how we clear the payload state in general when disabling the topology, and it turns out there's actually two subtle issues here. The first is that we're not grabbing &mgr.payload_lock when clearing the payloads in drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst(). Seeing as the canonical lock order is &mgr.payload_lock -> &mgr.lock (because we always want &mgr.lock to be the inner-most lock so topology validation always works), this makes perfect sense. It also means that -technically- there could be racing between someone calling drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst() to disable the topology, along with a modeset occurring that's modifying the payload state at the same time. The second is the more obvious issue that Wayne Lin discovered, that we're not clearing proposed_payloads when disabling the topology. I actually can't see any obvious places where the racing caused by the first issue would break something, and it could be that some of our higher-level locks already prevent this by happenstance, but better safe then sorry. So, let's make it so that drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst() first grabs &mgr.payload_lock followed by &mgr.lock so that we never race when modifying the payload state. Then, we also clear proposed_payloads to fix the original issue of enabling a new topology with a dirty payload state. This doesn't clear any of the drm_dp_vcpi structures, but those are getting destroyed along with the ports anyway. Changes since v1: * Use sizeof(mgr->payloads[0])/sizeof(mgr->proposed_vcpis[0]) instead - vsyrjala Cc: Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run> Cc: Wayne Lin <Wayne.Lin@amd.com> Cc: Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Signed-off-by:
Lyude Paul <lyude@redhat.com> Reviewed-by:
Ville Syrjälä <ville.syrjala@linux.intel.com> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200122194321.14953-1-lyude@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
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Lyude Paul authored
[ Upstream commit a8667596 ] This reverts commit 64e62bdf . This commit ends up causing some lockdep splats due to trying to grab the payload lock while holding the mgr's lock: [ 54.010099] [ 54.011765] ====================================================== [ 54.018670] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [ 54.025577] 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 Not tainted [ 54.031610] ------------------------------------------------------ [ 54.038516] kworker/1:6/1040 is trying to acquire lock: [ 54.044354] ffff888272af3228 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.054957] [ 54.054957] but task is already holding lock: [ 54.061473] ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4 [ 54.071193] [ 54.071193] which lock already depends on the new lock. [ 54.071193] [ 54.080334] [ 54.080334] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [ 54.088697] [ 54.088697] -> #1 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}: [ 54.094440] __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498 [ 54.099015] drm_dp_mst_topology_get_port_validated+0x25/0x80 [ 54.106018] drm_dp_update_payload_part1+0xa2/0x2e2 [ 54.112051] intel_mst_pre_enable_dp+0x144/0x18f [ 54.117791] intel_encoders_pre_enable+0x63/0x70 [ 54.123532] hsw_crtc_enable+0xa1/0x722 [ 54.128396] intel_update_crtc+0x50/0x194 [ 54.133455] skl_commit_modeset_enables+0x40c/0x540 [ 54.139485] intel_atomic_commit_tail+0x5f7/0x130d [ 54.145418] intel_atomic_commit+0x2c8/0x2d8 [ 54.150770] drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x5a/0x70 [ 54.156801] drm_mode_setcrtc+0x2ab/0x833 [ 54.161862] drm_ioctl+0x2e5/0x424 [ 54.166242] vfs_ioctl+0x21/0x2f [ 54.170426] do_vfs_ioctl+0x5fb/0x61e [ 54.175096] ksys_ioctl+0x55/0x75 [ 54.179377] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a/0x1e [ 54.184146] do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x6d [ 54.188721] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe [ 54.194946] [ 54.194946] -> #0 (&mgr->payload_lock){+.+.}: [ 54.201463] [ 54.201463] other info that might help us debug this: [ 54.201463] [ 54.210410] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 54.210410] [ 54.217025] CPU0 CPU1 [ 54.222082] ---- ---- [ 54.227138] lock(&mgr->lock); [ 54.230643] lock(&mgr->payload_lock); [ 54.237742] lock(&mgr->lock); [ 54.244062] lock(&mgr->payload_lock); [ 54.248346] [ 54.248346] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 54.248346] [ 54.254959] 7 locks held by kworker/1:6/1040: [ 54.259822] #0: ffff888275c4f528 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}, at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.269451] #1: ffffc9000119beb0 ((work_completion)(&(&dev_priv->hotplug.hotplug_work)->work)){+.+.}, at: worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.282768] #2: ffff888272a403f0 (&dev->mode_config.mutex){+.+.}, at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x4b/0x2be [ 54.293368] #3: ffffffff824fc6c0 (drm_connector_list_iter){.+.+}, at: i915_hotplug_work_func+0x17e/0x2be [ 54.304061] #4: ffffc9000119bc58 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}, at: drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x40/0xfd [ 54.314855] #5: ffff888272a40470 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}, at: drm_modeset_lock+0x74/0xe2 [ 54.324385] #6: ffff888272af3060 (&mgr->lock){+.+.}, at: drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x3c/0x2e4 [ 54.334597] [ 54.334597] stack backtrace: [ 54.339464] CPU: 1 PID: 1040 Comm: kworker/1:6 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc6-02274-g77381c23ee63 #47 [ 54.348893] Hardware name: Google Fizz/Fizz, BIOS Google_Fizz.10139.39.0 01/04/2018 [ 54.357451] Workqueue: events i915_hotplug_work_func [ 54.362995] Call Trace: [ 54.365724] dump_stack+0x71/0x9c [ 54.369427] check_noncircular+0x91/0xbc [ 54.373809] ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66 [ 54.378286] ? __lock_acquire+0xc9e/0xf66 [ 54.382763] ? lock_acquire+0x175/0x1ac [ 54.387048] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.393177] ? __mutex_lock+0xc3/0x498 [ 54.397362] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.403492] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.409620] ? drm_dp_dpcd_access+0xd9/0x101 [ 54.414390] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.420517] ? drm_dp_mst_topology_mgr_set_mst+0x218/0x2e4 [ 54.426645] ? intel_digital_port_connected+0x34d/0x35c [ 54.432482] ? intel_dp_detect+0x227/0x44e [ 54.437056] ? ww_mutex_lock+0x49/0x9a [ 54.441242] ? drm_helper_probe_detect_ctx+0x75/0xfd [ 54.446789] ? intel_encoder_hotplug+0x4b/0x97 [ 54.451752] ? intel_ddi_hotplug+0x61/0x2e0 [ 54.456423] ? mark_held_locks+0x53/0x68 [ 54.460803] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x3a/0x51 [ 54.466347] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x187/0x1a4 [ 54.471310] ? drm_connector_list_iter_next+0x89/0x9a [ 54.476953] ? i915_hotplug_work_func+0x206/0x2be [ 54.482208] ? worker_thread+0x4d5/0x6e2 [ 54.486587] ? worker_thread+0x455/0x6e2 [ 54.490966] ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64 [ 54.495151] ? kthread+0x1e9/0x1f1 [ 54.498946] ? queue_work_on+0x64/0x64 [ 54.503130] ? kthread_unpark+0x5e/0x5e [ 54.507413] ? ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 The proper fix for this is probably cleanup the VCPI allocations when we're enabling the topology, or on the first payload allocation. For now though, let's just revert. Signed-off-by:
Sean Paul <sean@poorly.run> Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20200117205149.97262-1-lyude@redhat.com Signed-off-by:
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Mark Brown authored
commit b8fdef31 upstream. Compilers with branch protection support can be configured to enable it by default, it is likely that distributions will do this as part of deploying branch protection system wide. As well as the slight overhead from having some extra NOPs for unused branch protection features this can cause more serious problems when the kernel is providing pointer authentication to userspace but not built for pointer authentication itself. In that case our switching of keys for userspace can affect the kernel unexpectedly, causing pointer authentication instructions in the kernel to corrupt addresses. To ensure that we get consistent and reliable behaviour always explicitly initialise the branch protection mode, ensuring that the kernel is built the same way regardless of the compiler defaults. [This is a reworked version of b8fdef31 ("arm64: Always force a branch protection mode when the compiler has one") for backport. Kernels prior to 74afda40 ("arm64: compile the kernel with ptrauth return address signing") don't have any Makefile machinery for forcing on pointer auth but still have issues if the compiler defaults it on so need this reworked version. -- broonie] Fixes: 75031975 (arm64: add basic pointer authentication support) Reported-by:
Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by:
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Michael Ellerman authored
commit 7053f80d upstream. The previous commit reduced the amount of code that is run before we setup a paca. However there are still a few remaining functions that run with no paca, or worse, with an arbitrary value in r13 that will be used as a paca pointer. In particular the stack protector canary is stored in the paca, so if stack protector is activated for any of these functions we will read the stack canary from wherever r13 points. If r13 happens to point outside of memory we will get a machine check / checkstop. For example if we modify initialise_paca() to trigger stack protection, and then boot in the mambo simulator with r13 poisoned in skiboot before calling the kernel: DEBUG: 19952232: (19952232): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC0000000191FC1E8: [0x3C4C006D]: addis r2,r12,0x6D [fetch] DEBUG: 19952236: (19952236): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC00000001807EAD8: [0x7D8802A6]: mflr r12 [fetch] FATAL ERROR: 19952276: (19952276): Check Stop for 0:0: Machine Check with ME bit of MSR off DEBUG: 19952276: (19952276): INSTRUCTION: PC=0xC0000000191FCA7C: [0xE90D0CF8]: ld r8,0xCF8(r13) [Instruction Failed] INFO: 19952276: (19952277): ** Execution stopped: Mambo Error, Machine Check Stop, ** systemsim % bt pc: 0xC0000000191FCA7C initialise_paca+0x54 lr: 0xC0000000191FC22C early_setup+0x44 stack:0x00000000198CBED0 0x0 +0x0 stack:0x00000000198CBF00 0xC0000000191FC22C early_setup+0x44 stack:0x00000000198CBF90 0x1801C968 +0x1801C968 So annotate the relevant functions to ensure stack protection is never enabled for them. Fixes: 06ec27ae ("powerpc/64: add stack protector support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Signed-off-by:
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Christophe Leroy authored
commit 21f8b2fa upstream. When a program check exception happens while MMU translation is disabled, following Oops happens in kprobe_handler() in the following code: } else if (*addr != BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION) { BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0x0000e268 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000ec34 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=16K PREEMPT CMPC885 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 429 Comm: cat Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-s3k-dev-00824-g84195dc6c58a #3267 NIP: c000ec34 LR: c000ecd8 CTR: c019cab8 REGS: ca4d3b58 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (5.6.0-rc1-s3k-dev-00824-g84195dc6c58a) MSR: 00001032 <ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 2a4d3c52 XER: 00000000 DAR: 0000e268 DSISR: c0000000 GPR00: c000b09c ca4d3c10 c66d0620 00000000 ca4d3c60 00000000 00009032 00000000 GPR08: 00020000 00000000 c087de44 c000afe0 c66d0ad0 100d3dd6 fffffff3 00000000 GPR16: 00000000 00000041 00000000 ca4d3d70 00000000 00000000 0000416d 00000000 GPR24: 00000004 c53b6128 00000000 0000e268 00000000 c07c0000 c07bb6fc ca4d3c60 NIP [c000ec34] kprobe_handler+0x128/0x290 LR [c000ecd8] kprobe_handler+0x1cc/0x290 Call Trace: [ca4d3c30] [c000b09c] program_check_exception+0xbc/0x6fc [ca4d3c50] [c000e43c] ret_from_except_full+0x0/0x4 --- interrupt: 700 at 0xe268 Instruction dump: 913e0008 81220000 38600001 3929ffff 91220000 80010024 bb410008 7c0803a6 38210020 4e800020 38600000 4e800020 <813b0000> 6d2a7fe0 2f8a0008 419e0154 ---[ end trace 5b9152d4cdadd06d ]--- kprobe is not prepared to handle events in real mode and functions running in real mode should have been blacklisted, so kprobe_handler() can safely bail out telling 'this trap is not mine' for any trap that happened while in real-mode. If the trap happened with MSR_IR or MSR_DR cleared, return 0 immediately. Reported-by:
Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net> Fixes: 6cc89bad ("powerpc/kprobes: Invoke handlers directly") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.10+ Signed-off-by:
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Reviewed-by:
Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Cédric Le Goater authored
commit 97ef2750 upstream. The PowerNV platform has multiple IRQ chips and the xmon command dumping the state of the XIVE interrupt should only operate on the XIVE IRQ chip. Fixes: 5896163f ("powerpc/xmon: Improve output of XIVE interrupts") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.4+ Signed-off-by:
Cédric Le Goater <clg@kaod.org> Reviewed-by:
Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org> Signed-off-by:
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Daniel Axtens authored
commit d4a8e986 upstream. Currently we set up the paca after parsing the device tree for CPU features. Prior to that, r13 contains random data, which means there is random data in r13 while we're running the generic dt parsing code. This random data varies depending on whether we boot through a vmlinux or a zImage: for the vmlinux case it's usually around zero, but for zImages we see random values like 912a72603d420015. This is poor practice, and can also lead to difficult-to-debug crashes. For example, when kcov is enabled, the kcov instrumentation attempts to read preempt_count out of the current task, which goes via the paca. This then crashes in the zImage case. Similarly stack protector can cause crashes if r13 is bogus, by reading from the stack canary in the paca. To resolve this: - move the paca setup to before the CPU feature parsing. - because we no longer have access to CPU feature flags in paca setup, change the HV feature test in the paca setup path to consider the actual value of the MSR rather than the CPU feature. Translations get switched on once we leave early_setup, so I think we'd already catch any other cases where the paca or task aren't set up. Boot tested on a P9 guest and host. Fixes: fb0b0a73 ("powerpc: Enable kcov") Fixes: 06ec27ae ("powerpc/64: add stack protector support") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.20+ Reviewed-by:
Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by:
Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> [mpe: Reword comments & change log a bit to mention stack protector] Signed-off-by:
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Cédric Le Goater authored
commit b1a504a6 upstream. When a CPU is brought up, an IPI number is allocated and recorded under the XIVE CPU structure. Invalid IPI numbers are tracked with interrupt number 0x0. On the PowerNV platform, the interrupt number space starts at 0x10 and this works fine. However, on the sPAPR platform, it is possible to allocate the interrupt number 0x0 and this raises an issue when CPU 0 is unplugged. The XIVE spapr driver tracks allocated interrupt numbers in a bitmask and it is not correctly updated when interrupt number 0x0 is freed. It stays allocated and it is then impossible to reallocate. Fix by using the XIVE_BAD_IRQ value instead of zero on both platforms. Reported-by:
David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au> Fixes: eac1e731 ("powerpc/xive: guest exploitation of the XIVE interrupt controller") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Signed-off-by:
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Aneesh Kumar K.V authored
commit 36b78402 upstream. H_PAGE_THP_HUGE is used to differentiate between a THP hugepage and hugetlb hugepage entries. The difference is WRT how we handle hash fault on these address. THP address enables MPSS in segments. We want to manage devmap hugepage entries similar to THP pt entries. Hence use H_PAGE_THP_HUGE for devmap huge PTE entries. With current code while handling hash PTE fault, we do set is_thp = true when finding devmap PTE huge PTE entries. Current code also does the below sequence we setting up huge devmap entries. entry = pmd_mkhuge(pfn_t_pmd(pfn, prot)); if (pfn_t_devmap(pfn)) entry = pmd_mkdevmap(entry); In that case we would find both H_PAGE_THP_HUGE and PAGE_DEVMAP set for huge devmap PTE entries. This results in false positive error like below. kernel BUG at /home/kvaneesh/src/linux/mm/memory.c:4321! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries Modules linked in: CPU: 56 PID: 67996 Comm: t_mmap_dio Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4-59640-g371c804dedbc #128 .... NIP [c00000000044c9e4] __follow_pte_pmd+0x264/0x900 LR [c0000000005d45f8] dax_writeback_one+0x1a8/0x740 Call Trace: str_spec.74809+0x22ffb4/0x2d116c (unreliable) dax_writeback_one+0x1a8/0x740 dax_writeback_mapping_range+0x26c/0x700 ext4_dax_writepages+0x150/0x5a0 do_writepages+0x68/0x180 __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x138/0x180 file_write_and_wait_range+0xa4/0x110 ext4_sync_file+0x370/0x6e0 vfs_fsync_range+0x70/0xf0 sys_msync+0x220/0x2e0 system_call+0x5c/0x68 This is because our pmd_trans_huge check doesn't exclude _PAGE_DEVMAP. To make this all consistent, update pmd_mkdevmap to set H_PAGE_THP_HUGE and pmd_trans_huge check now excludes _PAGE_DEVMAP correctly. Fixes: ebd31197 ("powerpc/mm: Add devmap support for ppc64") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.13+ Signed-off-by:
Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Laurentiu Tudor authored
commit aa411334 upstream. In the current implementation, the call to loadcam_multi() is wrapped between switch_to_as1() and restore_to_as0() calls so, when it tries to create its own temporary AS=1 TLB1 entry, it ends up duplicating the existing one created by switch_to_as1(). Add a check to skip creating the temporary entry if already running in AS=1. Fixes: d9e1831a ("powerpc/85xx: Load all early TLB entries at once") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.4+ Signed-off-by:
Laurentiu Tudor <laurentiu.tudor@nxp.com> Acked-by:
Scott Wood <oss@buserror.net> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Ellerman authored
commit c7def7fb upstream. In restore_tm_sigcontexts() we take the trap value directly from the user sigcontext with no checking: err |= __get_user(regs->trap, &sc->gp_regs[PT_TRAP]); This means we can be in the kernel with an arbitrary regs->trap value. Although that's not immediately problematic, there is a risk we could trigger one of the uses of CHECK_FULL_REGS(): #define CHECK_FULL_REGS(regs) BUG_ON(regs->trap & 1) It can also cause us to unnecessarily save non-volatile GPRs again in save_nvgprs(), which shouldn't be problematic but is still wrong. It's also possible it could trick the syscall restart machinery, which relies on regs->trap not being == 0xc00 (see 9a81c16b ("powerpc: fix double syscall restarts")), though I haven't been able to make that happen. Finally it doesn't match the behaviour of the non-TM case, in restore_sigcontext() which zeroes regs->trap. So change restore_tm_sigcontexts() to zero regs->trap. This was discovered while testing Nick's upcoming rewrite of the syscall entry path. In that series the call to save_nvgprs() prior to signal handling (do_notify_resume()) is removed, which leaves the low-bit of regs->trap uncleared which can then trigger the FULL_REGS() WARNs in setup_tm_sigcontexts(). Fixes: 2b0a576d ("powerpc: Add new transactional memory state to the signal context") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.9+ Signed-off-by:
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Clement Courbet authored
commit c17eb4dc upstream. Declaring setjmp()/longjmp() as taking longs makes the signature non-standard, and makes clang complain. In the past, this has been worked around by adding -ffreestanding to the compile flags. The implementation looks like it only ever propagates the value (in longjmp) or sets it to 1 (in setjmp), and we only call longjmp with integer parameters. This allows removing -ffreestanding from the compilation flags. Fixes: c9029ef9 ("powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.14+ Signed-off-by:
Clement Courbet <courbet@google.com> Reviewed-by:
Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Tested-by:
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Bart Van Assche authored
commit 72655c0e upstream. This patch fixes the following two complaints: WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1326 at kernel/locking/mutex-debug.c:103 mutex_destroy+0x74/0x80 Modules linked in: scsi_debug sd_mod t10_pi brd scsi_transport_iscsi af_packet crct10dif_pclmul sg aesni_intel glue_helper virtio_balloon button crypto_simd cryptd intel_agp intel_gtt agpgart ip_tables x_tables ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv6 autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid hid sr_mod cdrom ata_generic pata_acpi virtio_blk virtio_net net_failover failover ata_piix xhci_pci ahci libahci xhci_hcd i2c_piix4 libata virtio_pci usbcore i2c_core virtio_ring scsi_mod usb_common virtio [last unloaded: scsi_debug] CPU: 3 PID: 1326 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 5.6.0-rc1-dbg+ #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:mutex_destroy+0x74/0x80 Call Trace: sr_kref_release+0xb9/0xd0 [sr_mod] scsi_cd_put+0x79/0x90 [sr_mod] sr_block_release+0x54/0x70 [sr_mod] __blkdev_put+0x2ce/0x3c0 blkdev_put+0x68/0x220 blkdev_close+0x4d/0x60 __fput+0x170/0x3b0 ____fput+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0xa2/0xf0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xeb/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x2be/0x300 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fa16d40aab7 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x98/0x420 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881c6e4f4b0 by task systemd-udevd/1326 CPU: 3 PID: 1326 Comm: systemd-udevd Tainted: G W 5.6.0-rc1-dbg+ #1 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xa5/0xe6 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x46/0x60 __kasan_report.cold+0x7b/0x94 kasan_report+0x16/0x20 check_memory_region+0x140/0x1b0 __kasan_check_read+0x15/0x20 __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x98/0x420 mutex_unlock+0x16/0x20 sr_block_release+0x5c/0x70 [sr_mod] __blkdev_put+0x2ce/0x3c0 hardirqs last enabled at (1875522): [<ffffffff81bb0696>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x56/0x70 blkdev_put+0x68/0x220 blkdev_close+0x4d/0x60 __fput+0x170/0x3b0 ____fput+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0xa2/0xf0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xeb/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x2be/0x300 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fa16d40aab7 Allocated by task 3201: save_stack+0x23/0x90 __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 kasan_kmalloc+0xd/0x10 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x161/0x3c0 sr_probe+0x12f/0xb60 [sr_mod] really_probe+0x183/0x5d0 driver_probe_device+0x13f/0x1a0 __device_attach_driver+0xe6/0x150 bus_for_each_drv+0x101/0x160 __device_attach+0x183/0x230 device_initial_probe+0x17/0x20 bus_probe_device+0x110/0x130 device_add+0xb7b/0xd40 scsi_sysfs_add_sdev+0xe8/0x360 [scsi_mod] scsi_probe_and_add_lun+0xdc4/0x14c0 [scsi_mod] __scsi_scan_target+0x12d/0x850 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_channel+0xcd/0xe0 [scsi_mod] scsi_scan_host_selected+0x182/0x190 [scsi_mod] store_scan+0x1e9/0x200 [scsi_mod] dev_attr_store+0x42/0x60 sysfs_kf_write+0x8b/0xb0 kernfs_fop_write+0x158/0x250 __vfs_write+0x4c/0x90 vfs_write+0x145/0x2c0 ksys_write+0xd7/0x180 __x64_sys_write+0x47/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x300 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Freed by task 1326: save_stack+0x23/0x90 __kasan_slab_free+0x13a/0x190 kasan_slab_free+0x12/0x20 kfree+0x109/0x410 sr_kref_release+0xc1/0xd0 [sr_mod] scsi_cd_put+0x79/0x90 [sr_mod] sr_block_release+0x54/0x70 [sr_mod] __blkdev_put+0x2ce/0x3c0 blkdev_put+0x68/0x220 blkdev_close+0x4d/0x60 __fput+0x170/0x3b0 ____fput+0x12/0x20 task_work_run+0xa2/0xf0 exit_to_usermode_loop+0xeb/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x2be/0x300 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200330025151.10535-1-bvanassche@acm.org Fixes: 51a85881 ("scsi: sr: get rid of sr global mutex") Cc: Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@archive.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Merlijn Wajer <merlijn@archive.org> Signed-off-by:
Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by:
Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by:
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Merlijn Wajer authored
commit 51a85881 upstream. When replacing the Big Kernel Lock in commit 2a48fc0a ("block: autoconvert trivial BKL users to private mutex"), the lock was replaced with a sr-wide lock. This causes very poor performance when using multiple sr devices, as the sr driver was not able to execute more than one command to one drive at any given time, even when there were many CD drives available. Replace the global mutex with per-sr-device mutex. Someone tried this patch at the time, but it never made it upstream, due to possible concerns with race conditions, but it's not clear the patch actually caused those: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-scsi/msg63706.html https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-scsi/msg63750.html Also see http://lists.xiph.org/pipermail/paranoia/2019-December/001647.html Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200218143918.30267-1-merlijn@archive.org Acked-by:
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by:
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Juergen Gross authored
commit 3a169c0b upstream. Commit 1d5c76e6 ("xen-blkfront: switch kcalloc to kvcalloc for large array allocation") didn't fix the issue it was meant to, as the flags for allocating the memory are GFP_NOIO, which will lead the memory allocation falling back to kmalloc(). So instead of GFP_NOIO use GFP_KERNEL and do all the memory allocation in blkfront_setup_indirect() in a memalloc_noio_{save,restore} section. Fixes: 1d5c76e6 ("xen-blkfront: switch kcalloc to kvcalloc for large array allocation") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reviewed-by:
Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com> Acked-by:
Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200403090034.8753-1-jgross@suse.com Signed-off-by:
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Wen Yang authored
commit 32830a05 upstream. The wait_event() function is used to detect command completion. When send_guid_cmd() returns an error, smi_send() has not been called to send data. Therefore, wait_event() should not be used on the error path, otherwise it will cause the following warning: [ 1361.588808] systemd-udevd D 0 1501 1436 0x00000004 [ 1361.588813] ffff883f4b1298c0 0000000000000000 ffff883f4b188000 ffff887f7e3d9f40 [ 1361.677952] ffff887f64bd4280 ffffc90037297a68 ffffffff8173ca3b ffffc90000000010 [ 1361.767077] 00ffc90037297ad0 ffff887f7e3d9f40 0000000000000286 ffff883f4b188000 [ 1361.856199] Call Trace: [ 1361.885578] [<ffffffff8173ca3b>] ? __schedule+0x23b/0x780 [ 1361.951406] [<ffffffff8173cfb6>] schedule+0x36/0x80 [ 1362.010979] [<ffffffffa071f178>] get_guid+0x118/0x150 [ipmi_msghandler] [ 1362.091281] [<ffffffff810d5350>] ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x100/0x100 [ 1362.168533] [<ffffffffa071f755>] ipmi_register_smi+0x405/0x940 [ipmi_msghandler] [ 1362.258337] [<ffffffffa0230ae9>] try_smi_init+0x529/0x950 [ipmi_si] [ 1362.334521] [<ffffffffa022f350>] ? std_irq_setup+0xd0/0xd0 [ipmi_si] [ 1362.411701] [<ffffffffa0232bd2>] init_ipmi_si+0x492/0x9e0 [ipmi_si] [ 1362.487917] [<ffffffffa0232740>] ? ipmi_pci_probe+0x280/0x280 [ipmi_si] [ 1362.568219] [<ffffffff810021a0>] do_one_initcall+0x50/0x180 [ 1362.636109] [<ffffffff812231b2>] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x142/0x190 [ 1362.714330] [<ffffffff811b2ae1>] do_init_module+0x5f/0x200 [ 1362.781208] [<ffffffff81123ca8>] load_module+0x1898/0x1de0 [ 1362.848069] [<ffffffff811202e0>] ? __symbol_put+0x60/0x60 [ 1362.913886] [<ffffffff8130696b>] ? security_kernel_post_read_file+0x6b/0x80 [ 1362.998514] [<ffffffff81124465>] SYSC_finit_module+0xe5/0x120 [ 1363.068463] [<ffffffff81124465>] ? SYSC_finit_module+0xe5/0x120 [ 1363.140513] [<ffffffff811244be>] SyS_finit_module+0xe/0x10 [ 1363.207364] [<ffffffff81003c04>] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x180 Fixes: 50c812b2 ("[PATCH] ipmi: add full sysfs support") Signed-off-by:
Wen Yang <wenyang@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Corey Minyard <minyard@acm.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: openipmi-developer@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.17- Message-Id: <20200403090408.58745-1-wenyang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by:
Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com> Signed-off-by:
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Kai-Heng Feng authored
commit 8305f72f upstream. During system resume from suspend, this can be observed on ASM1062 PMP controller: ata10.01: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 330) ata10.02: hard resetting link ata10.02: SATA link down (SStatus 0 SControl 330) ata10.00: configured for UDMA/133 Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel in: sata_pmp_eh_recover+0xa2b/0xa40 CPU: 2 PID: 230 Comm: scsi_eh_9 Tainted: P OE #49-Ubuntu Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product 1001 12/10/2017 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x63/0x8b panic+0xe4/0x244 ? sata_pmp_eh_recover+0xa2b/0xa40 __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x20 sata_pmp_eh_recover+0xa2b/0xa40 ? ahci_do_softreset+0x260/0x260 [libahci] ? ahci_do_hardreset+0x140/0x140 [libahci] ? ata_phys_link_offline+0x60/0x60 ? ahci_stop_engine+0xc0/0xc0 [libahci] sata_pmp_error_handler+0x22/0x30 ahci_error_handler+0x45/0x80 [libahci] ata_scsi_port_error_handler+0x29b/0x770 ? ata_scsi_cmd_error_handler+0x101/0x140 ata_scsi_error+0x95/0xd0 ? scsi_try_target_reset+0x90/0x90 scsi_error_handler+0xd0/0x5b0 kthread+0x121/0x140 ? scsi_eh_get_sense+0x200/0x200 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 Kernel Offset: 0xcc00000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Since sata_pmp_eh_recover_pmp() doens't set rc when ATA_DFLAG_DETACH is set, sata_pmp_eh_recover() continues to run. During retry it triggers the stack protector. Set correct rc in sata_pmp_eh_recover_pmp() to let sata_pmp_eh_recover() jump to pmp_fail directly. BugLink: https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1821434 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com> Signed-off-by:
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by:
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Simon Gander authored
commit 25efb2ff upstream. When removing files containing extended attributes, the hfsplus driver may remove the wrong entries from the attributes b-tree, causing major filesystem damage and in some cases even kernel crashes. To remove a file, all its extended attributes have to be removed as well. The driver does this by looking up all keys in the attributes b-tree with the cnid of the file. Each of these entries then gets deleted using the key used for searching, which doesn't contain the attribute's name when it should. Since the key doesn't contain the name, the deletion routine will not find the correct entry and instead remove the one in front of it. If parent nodes have to be modified, these become corrupt as well. This causes invalid links and unsorted entries that not even macOS's fsck_hfs is able to fix. To fix this, modify the search key before an entry is deleted from the attributes b-tree by copying the found entry's key into the search key, therefore ensuring that the correct entry gets removed from the tree. Signed-off-by:
Simon Gander <simon@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by:
Anton Altaparmakov <anton@tuxera.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200327155541.1521-1-simon@tuxera.com Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
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Oliver O'Halloran authored
commit d0a72efa upstream. The cpufreq driver has a use-after-free that we can hit if: a) There's an OCC message pending when the notifier is registered, and b) The cpufreq driver fails to register with the core. When a) occurs the notifier schedules a workqueue item to handle the message. The backing work_struct is located on chips[].throttle and when b) happens we clean up by freeing the array. Once we get to the (now free) queued item and the kernel crashes. Fixes: c5e29ea7 ("cpufreq: powernv: Fix bugs in powernv_cpufreq_{init/exit}") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.6+ Signed-off-by:
Oliver O'Halloran <oohall@gmail.com> Reviewed-by:
Gautham R. Shenoy <ego@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit d7d27cfc upstream. Patch series "module autoloading fixes and cleanups", v5. This series fixes a bug where request_module() was reporting success to kernel code when module autoloading had been completely disabled via 'echo > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe'. It also addresses the issues raised on the original thread (https://lkml.kernel.org/lkml/20200310223731.126894-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u ) bydocumenting the modprobe sysctl, adding a self-test for the empty path case, and downgrading a user-reachable WARN_ONCE(). This patch (of 4): It's long been possible to disable kernel module autoloading completely (while still allowing manual module insertion) by setting /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe to the empty string. This can be preferable to setting it to a nonexistent file since it avoids the overhead of an attempted execve(), avoids potential deadlocks, and avoids the call to security_kernel_module_request() and thus on SELinux-based systems eliminates the need to write SELinux rules to dontaudit module_request. However, when module autoloading is disabled in this way, request_module() returns 0. This is broken because callers expect 0 to mean that the module was successfully loaded. Apparently this was never noticed because this method of disabling module autoloading isn't used much, and also most callers don't use the return value of request_module() since it's always necessary to check whether the module registered its functionality or not anyway. But improperly returning 0 can indeed confuse a few callers, for example get_fs_type() in fs/filesystems.c where it causes a WARNING to be hit: if (!fs && (request_module("fs-%.*s", len, name) == 0)) { fs = __get_fs_type(name, len); WARN_ONCE(!fs, "request_module fs-%.*s succeeded, but still no fs?\n", len, name); } This is easily reproduced with: echo > /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe mount -t NONEXISTENT none / It causes: request_module fs-NONEXISTENT succeeded, but still no fs? WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 1106 at fs/filesystems.c:275 get_fs_type+0xd6/0xf0 [...] This should actually use pr_warn_once() rather than WARN_ONCE(), since it's also user-reachable if userspace immediately unloads the module. Regardless, request_module() should correctly return an error when it fails. So let's make it return -ENOENT, which matches the error when the modprobe binary doesn't exist. I've also sent patches to document and test this case. Signed-off-by:
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by:
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by:
Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <benh@debian.org> Cc: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200310223731.126894-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200312202552.241885-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by:
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Paul Cercueil authored
commit edcc4294 upstream. When requesting a rate superior to the parent's rate, it would return -EINVAL instead of simply returning the parent's rate like it should. Fixes: 4f89e4b8 ("clk: ingenic: Add driver for the TCU clocks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Paul Cercueil <paul@crapouillou.net> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200213161952.37460-2-paul@crapouillou.net Signed-off-by:
Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
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Paul Cercueil authored
commit c067b46d upstream. Exit jz4770_cgu_init() if the 'cgu' pointer we get is NULL, since the pointer is passed as argument to functions later on. Fixes: 7a01c190 ("clk: Add Ingenic jz4770 CGU driver") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by:
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200213161952.37460-1-paul@crapouillou.net Signed-off-by:
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Masami Hiramatsu authored
commit 6a13a0d7 upstream. Show maxactive parameter on kprobe_events. This allows user to save the current configuration and restore it without losing maxactive parameter. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4762764a-6df7-bc93-ed60-e336146dce1f@gmail.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/158503528846.22706.5549974121212526020.stgit@devnote2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 696ced4f ("tracing/kprobes: expose maxactive for kretprobe in kprobe_events") Reported-by:
Taeung Song <treeze.taeung@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by:
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Hans de Goede authored
commit ebc68ced upstream. The Acer Aspire 5738z has a button to disable (and re-enable) the touchpad next to the touchpad. When this button is pressed a LED underneath indicates that the touchpad is disabled (and an event is send to userspace and GNOME shows its touchpad enabled / disable OSD thingie). So far so good, but after re-enabling the touchpad it no longer works. The laptop does not have an external ps2 port, so mux mode is not needed and disabling mux mode fixes the touchpad no longer working after toggling it off and back on again, so lets add this laptop model to the nomux list. Signed-off-by:
Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200331123947.318908-1-hdegoede@redhat.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
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Michael Mueller authored
commit 6c7c851f upstream. Show the full diag statistic table and not just parts of it. The issue surfaced in a KVM guest with a number of vcpus defined smaller than NR_DIAG_STAT. Fixes: 1ec2772e ("s390/diag: add a statistic for diagnose calls") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by:
Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by:
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
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Sam Lunt authored
commit b9c9ce4e upstream. Python 3.8 changed the output of 'python-config --ldflags' to no longer include the '-lpythonX.Y' flag (this apparently fixed an issue loading modules with a statically linked Python executable). The libpython feature check in linux/build/feature fails if the Python library is not included in FEATURE_CHECK_LDFLAGS-libpython variable. This adds a check in the Makefile to determine if PYTHON_CONFIG accepts the '--embed' flag and passes that flag alongside '--ldflags' if so. tools/perf is the only place the libpython feature check is used. Signed-off-by:
Sam Lunt <samuel.j.lunt@gmail.com> Tested-by:
He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/c56be2e1-8111-9dfe-8298-f7d0f9ab7431@windriver.com Acked-by:
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: trivial@kernel.org Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200131181123.tmamivhq4b7uqasr@gmail.com Signed-off-by:
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
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Changwei Ge authored
commit 783fda85 upstream. Linux fallocate(2) with FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE mode set, its offset can exceed the inode size. Ocfs2 now doesn't allow that offset beyond inode size. This restriction is not necessary and violates fallocate(2) semantics. If fallocate(2) offset is beyond inode size, just return success and do nothing further. Otherwise, ocfs2 will crash the kernel. kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2//alloc.c:7264! ocfs2_truncate_inline+0x20f/0x360 [ocfs2] ocfs2_remove_inode_range+0x23c/0xcb0 [ocfs2] __ocfs2_change_file_space+0x4a5/0x650 [ocfs2] ocfs2_fallocate+0x83/0xa0 [ocfs2] vfs_fallocate+0x148/0x230 SyS_fallocate+0x48/0x80 do_syscall_64+0x79/0x170 Signed-off-by:
Changwei Ge <chge@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by:
Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn> Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com> Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407082754.17565-1-chge@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by:
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Eric Biggers authored
commit 26c5d78c upstream. After request_module(), nothing is stopping the module from being unloaded until someone takes a reference to it via try_get_module(). The WARN_ONCE() in get_fs_type() is thus user-reachable, via userspace running 'rmmod' concurrently. Since WARN_ONCE() is for kernel bugs only, not for user-reachable situations, downgrade this warning to pr_warn_once(). Keep it printed once only, since the intent of this warning is to detect a bug in modprobe at boot time. Printing the warning more than once wouldn't really provide any useful extra information. Fixes: 41124db8 ("fs: warn in case userspace lied about modprobe return") Signed-off-by:
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